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ABSTRACT 
CORPORATE REPUTATION AND STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE 
MAY 1988 
BRADFORD J. KNIPES, B.B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Ph . D . , UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor Thomas Schneeweis 
The objective of this study is to investigate 
relationships among various dimensions of corporate 
reputation and strategic performance. 
Strategic performance may be considered to be the 
relationship of the whole organization to its 
environment. The literature on strategic management has 
recently focused on the use of finance theory and 
measures of risk in addition to traditional accounting 
measures of performance. The disciplines of management, 
economics, psychology, and sociology all suggest 
relationships between reputation and performance. This 
study examines possible relationships between corporate 
reputation and strategic performance. The reputation 
v 1 
data is from Fortune's annual survey of corporate 
reputations from 1982 to 1984. The sample consists of 
the 98 firms that were surveyed in all three years. 
Performance and risk data for the same firms are from the 
Compustat data base for the years 1977 to 1984. The 
sample was divided into two equal groups of 49 firms 
each, so that results for one group could be checked by 
comparison to results for the other. The two groups were 
matched for equal representation of industries and for 
overall reputation. 
The results show that reputation is related to 
certain measures of strategic performance, especially 
return on assets. Other accounting and market measures 
of performance and risk generally are not related to one 
another or to reputation. In general, reputation is not 
related to total stock return, but change in perceived 
quality of management is strongly related to total stock- 
return. Change in quality of management is also related 
to prior quality of management. 
The conclusion is that reputation is a major aspect 
of performance. The Fortune survey data may be regarded 
as a valuable predictor of future return on assets. The 
relationship of change in perceived quality of management 
to total stock return merits further study. 
v 11 
"Je tiens impossible de connaitre les parties sans 
connaitre le tout, non plus que de connaitre le tout sans 
connaitre particulierement les parties." 
"I find it as impossible to know the parts without 
knowing the whole, as to know the whole without 
specifically knowing the parts." 
Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), Pensees, Chapter I 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this dissertation is to investigate 
the relationships among various dimensions of corporate 
reputation and strategic performance. In this chapter, 
the terms reputation and performance are defined, the 
importance of the relationship between reputation and 
performance is examined, and the literature review, 
hypotheses, data, and methodologies to be employed are 
briefly described. 
Definitions of Reputation and Performance 
The concept of reputation has been variously 
defined. Two narrow views of reputation lead to a more 
general view appropriate to the present study. Shapiro 
(1983:659) defined reputation primarily in terms of 
product quality, as "an asset...the goodwill value of the 
firm's brand name or loyal customer patronage. A firm 
has a good reputation if consumers believe its products 
to be of high quality." Earlier, Shapiro (1982:21) 
stated "...each consumer has some expectations regarding 
product quality. These expectations constitute the 
firm's reputation..." But reputation is not limited to 
1 
product quality. The dictionary defines reputation as 
"The general estimation in which a person is held by the 
public (The American Heritage Dictionary, 1985: 1050)." 
But reputation is not limited to persons. For the 
present study, corporate reputation is defined as the 
general estimation in which a firm is held by the public, 
including estimations of more specific attributes such as 
management or product quality. Corporate reputation will 
be operationally defined as results of the Fortune 
surveys of corporate reputation. 
Performance is such a fundamental concept that its 
general definition is usually left implicit and 
performance related definitions confined to particular 
approaches or measures (e.g. Chakravarthy, 1986; McGuire, 
Hill, & Schneeweis, 1986). The dictionary defines 
performance as "the way in which someone or something 
functions (The American Heritage Dictionary, 1985: 922). 
For the present study, corporate performance is defined 
as the results of a firm's operation. Corporate 
performance is operationally defined as certain variables 
obtained from COMPUSTAT1 including total stock return and 
return on assets. 
2 
Importance of the Study 
The relation of reputation to firm performance is 
important in many ways. Of primary importance is the 
influence reputation may have on performance. 
Modern corporate stakeholder theory suggests that 
reputation influences performance because the price 
stakeholders will pay for implicit claims depends on 
their expectations of future payouts (Cornell and 
Shapiro, 1986: 12). Implicit claims are unwritten, 
because they are too nebulous and contingent to reduce to 
writing at a reasonable cost. An example of an implicit 
claim is the promise of continuing service to customers. 
Implicit claims are sensitive to reputation because they 
are uncertain. By contrast, explicit claims are 
contractual obligations, like product warranties. It is 
easier for a firm to default on implicit claims, but they 
may see honoring them as an investment in reputation. 
In the same analysis, Cornell and Shapiro consider 
the distinction between investor and non-investor 
stakeholders in the influence of reputation on 
performance. In explaining the response of stock prices 
to announcements such as earnings and dividends, the 
finance literature has ignored the role of non-investor 
stakeholders. Non-investor stakeholders include 
customers, suppliers, providers of complementary services 
3 
and products, distributors, and employees. "...the 
response of stock prices to announcements should reflect 
investors' assessments of the reaction of other 
stakeholders to the information (Cornell and Shapiro, 
1986: 15). If a firm's reputation suffers, non-investor 
stakeholders may lower the value they place on a firm's 
implicit claims, or attempt to transfer implicit 
agreement into more costly explicit agreement, adversely 
affecting the firm's cash flow. 
To the degree that a strong reputation permits a 
firm to have a relatively greater percentage of implicit 
costs, that firm may have lower total debt. The low 
total debt ensures that the firm can more easily continue 
to meet its implicit and explicit claims, and so it will 
have lower total risk. Thus reputation may influence 
risk as well as performance. 
In studies relating corporate social responsibility, 
CSR, to performance, reputation is sometimes considered 
an intervening variable. Improved performance may come 
as a result of the increased employee and customer 
goodwill that have been cited as an important outcome of 
CSR (Soloman and Hanson, 1985). CSR activities may also 
improve the firm's reputation with important 
constituencies (e.g. bankers, investors, the govenrment) 
and may therefore bring economic benefits (Moussavi and 
4 
Evans, 1987). Indeed, banks and other institutional 
investors report CSR considerations to be a factor in 
their investment decisions (Spicer, 1978). 
An appreciation of the importance of reputation for 
performance in the literature of economics is pointed out 
by Kreps and Wilson (1982). Reputation is important in 
"...contract and labor negotiations; in a firm's 
employment practices; in a firm's 'good name' for its 
product; in the maintenance of a cartel; and in 
international diplomacy (Kreps and Wilson, 1982: 275)." 
To this list, Milgrom and Roberts (1982: 304) add "credit 
relationships...implicit contract models, and...the 
provision of auditing services, bond ratings, job 
recommendations, and the like." In the context of 
Industrial Organization, Sherer points to the 
"demonstration effect that sharp price cutting on one 
market can have on the behavior of actual or would-be 
rivals in other markets (1982: 253)." 
Kreps and Wilson (1982) present two game-theoretic 
models that illustrate the role of reputation in the 
predatory behavior of a monopolist facing potential 
entrants. The immediate cost of predatory pricing is a 
worthwhile investment to sustain or enhance its 
reputation, thereby deterring subsequent challenges and 
assuring high performance for the monopolist. 
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Theoretically, reputation, and especially perception 
of quality of managment, are related to leadership 
perception, to the broader subject of social perception, 
and to underlying social and cognitive processes 
(Cronshaw and Lord, 1987). Social cognition theory 
(Fiske and Shelley, 1984), categorization (Cantor & 
Mischel, 1979) and attribution (Kelley, 1973) are current 
areas of theory development that relate to reputation. 
Thus firm reputation is closely associated with the 
entire field of firm performance measurement, and the 
interrelationship between reputation and performance can 
be studied through a variety of disciplines including 
economics, management, psychology, and sociology. 
Practically, within organizations, management and 
leadership perceptions, affected by outside reputation, 
involve key interpersonal processes that affect formation 
of status or influence structures and the development of 
superior-subordinate relations (Seers & Graen, 1984). 
Ultimately, these interpersonal processes may affect 
membership in a dominant coalition, the choice of 
strategy, and corporate performance. 
Outside the organization, the importance of 
reputation is similar to the importance of expectations 
in the macroeconomic sphere: they are pervasive, crucial, 
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and sometimes volatile influences. Economic expectations 
can be self fulfilling: 
...for any particular set of current wages and 
prices, there may exist multiple expectational 
equilibria that exhibit "bootstraps" 
properties; e.g., if households expect that 
they will be unable to sell all their labor 
both this period and next, then it will turn 
out they they will be unable to sell all their 
labor; but had they expected there to be 
inflationary pressures this period and next, 
then that would have turned out to be the case 
instead (Neary and Stiglitz, 1983). 
If future inflation is expected, individual decisions may 
be taken that fuel it. If a stock market crash is 
expected, the ensuing rush of individual decisions to 
disinvest brings it down. 
Similarly, the fortunes of a firm may be influenced 
by expectations of it. Expectations of future 
performance are an aspect of a firms reputation. The 
abitility to raise capital is the ability to attract 
equity or debt financing with the expectation of future 
earnings, and those future earnings depend on the prior 
ability to attract financing. 
All stakeholders' decisions are affected by 
organizations' reputations. Stakeholder's decisions 
depend on predicting the outcomes of alternatives 
available to them. Corporate reputations are a major 
input to those evaluations, because reputation 
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incorporates an expectation of future performance. It 
may also influence it, through favorable or unfavorable 
decisions by investors, customers, competitors, 
suppliers, and regulators. 
Reputation is at once the product and the progenitor 
of individuals' evaluations of management. In Fortune's 
survey of corporate reputations for 1986 (Baig, 1987), 
Merck was ranked number one. The company's chairman, Dr. 
P. Roy Vagelos, described how this recognition of their 
reputation further improved that reputation and will 
likely benefit future performance: 
It did great things for the morale of the 
company and for our recruiting, because Merck 
is not a familiar corporate name. Now we are 
recognized on campuses, so our recruiting 
results have been just super (Fortune, 1988: 
38) . 
Reputation among experts is a major source of 
information about management quality. Discussions of 
reputation, and management literature and research in 
general, have implicitly assumed that the quality of a 
firm's management has a strong influence on the firm's 
performance. Management theory analyzes processes such 
as leadership, motivation, and decision making on the 
assumption that improving them will improve firm 
performance (Evans, 1970). For example, studies have 
indicated that one reason for high performance of 
8 
Japanese firms relative to U.S. firms is Japan's higher 
emphasis on management and product quality (Vogel, 
1979;1980). Japan has established a "quality" 
reputation. Gillingham and Zinger (1986) found that 
quality of management, based on frequent and formal 
training, resulted in higher performance, as measured 
return on equity. Gupta and Govindarajan (1984) found 
that greater marketing/sales experience, greater 
willingness to take risk, and greater tolerance for 
ambiguity on the part of the SBU general manager 
contribute to effectiveness in the case of "build" SBUs 
but hamper it in the case of "harvest" SBU's. 
Statement of the Problem 
The idea that positive firm and management 
reputation results in higher firm performance seems 
inherently plausible, but specific relationships must be 
established empirically. However, management and firm 
attributes are difficult to ascertain objectively and 
subjective methodologies have often been found necessary. 
Unfortunately, the subjective measures of management 
characteristics and firm attributes may result in certain 
biases, e.g interviewer bias. Objective measures of 
strategic performance are also frequently questioned 
(McGuire, Schneeweis, Hill, 1986). This is true of both 
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accounting measures (e.g., return on assets) and market 
determined measures (e.g. price/earnings ratio). An aim 
of this study is to empirically test the relationships 
among alternative subjective and objective factors. 
Results will improve our understanding of those measures 
currently in use. 
The primary problem to be addressed is: 
What are the relationships among expert 
evaluations of management performance and 
objective measures of prior, contemporaneous, 
and subsequent performance? 
Literature Review 
Chapter II is a review of relevant literature 
involving several fields of research: strategic 
performance, decision making, reputation, attribution, 
and perception. Selected works from the literatures of 
accounting and market based performance are also 
critically reviewed. 
Hypotheses 
Reputation is usually thought of as separate from 
performance. In this regard it is either a reflection of 
prior performance, or a prediction of future performance. 
Reputation is also seen as part of performance, as 
representing additional contemporaneous dimensions of 
10 
performance. Generalized hypotheses, to evolve from 
the literature review, are as follows: 
Hi: Corporate reputation is significantly 
related to prior strategic performance. 
H 2: Corporate reputation is significantly 
related to subsequent strategic performance. 
H3: Corporate reputation is significantly 
related to contemporaneous strategic 
performance. 
H4: The various dimensions of corporate 
reputation are highly correlated. 
Data 
The data for this study consist of perceived firm 
and management attributes obtained from Fortune's survey 
of corporate reputations (Baig, 1987, and prior surveys) 
and accounting and market measures of firm performance 
obtained from the COMPUSTAT data base. The attributes 
included in the Fortune study are: quality of 
management; quality of products or services; 
innovativeness; long-term investment value; financial 
soundness; ability to attract, develop, and keep talented 
people; community and environmental responsibility; and 
use of corporate assets. The accounting measures of firm 
performance include: return on assets (ROA), debt/assets 
ratio, average assets, income growth, sales growth, 
operating leverage, assets growth, and operating income 
11 
growth. The market measures include alpha, beta, and 
residuals. 
Methodology 
The study will employ ANOVA, correlation analysis, 
and simple and stepwise multiple regression analysis to 
determine the relations among perceptions of management 
quality, prior, contemporaneous, and subsequent firm 
performance. 
In chapter III, the hypotheses, the data and the 
statistical methodology to be employed are presented. 
In chapter IV, numerous relations among the dimensions of 
management performance and strategic performance are 
evaluated. In chapter V, the conclusions from this 
analysis and future directions for research will be 
discussed. 
We close the beginning by reminding ourselves that 
must understand something of performance throughout the 
different disciplines to understand performance in the 
field of strategic management, and we must understand the 
performance of many firms in a variety of dimensions to 
understand the performance of one firm in a single 
dimension. As Pascal said, we cannot know the part 
without knowledge of the whole, any more than we can know 
the whole without knowing its parts. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The objective of the present study is to investigate 
relationships among various dimensions of corporate 
reputation and strategic performance. While the 
literature dealing directly with these relationships is 
quite limited, relevant fields of study have 
independently developed very extensive bodies of 
literature. Relevant fields of study include decision 
making, perception, attribution, social cognition, 
accounting, finance, and strategic management. The 
present literature review is therefore at once broad and, 
within each area, selective. The objectives of this 
review are to establish the absolutely pervasive role of 
performance measurement and reputation, to identify 
specific theories and 'Search from the disparate fields 
that are concerned with reputation or performance, and to 
derive hypotheses about the relationships between 
reputation and performance. 
Strategic management literature is focused primarily 
on the influence of managerial decisions on 
organizational performance (McGuire and Schneeweis, 
1986; Ryne, 1986; Branch and Gale, 1983; Melicher and 
13 
Rush, 1974). Strategic management decisions include 
merger and acquision decisions, capital investment 
decisions, and new product decisions. Performance is an 
issue in many other ways, however. For example, the 
relationship between strategy making and structure was 
found to be strongest among organizations that perform 
well (Miller, 1987). The issue of performance is 
implicit in all management literature because management 
is variously defined as control or direction toward 
performance. 
Strategic Performance 
In their comparison of alternative approaches to 
measurement of business performance in strategy research, 
Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986) state: 
...the treatment of performance in research 
settings is perhaps one of the thorniest issues 
confronting the academic researcher today. 
With the volume of literature on this topic 
continually increasing, there appears to be 
little hope of reaching any agreement on basic 
terminology and definitions. 
These authors recommend that in view of the breadth 
and complexity of the topic, attention should be focused 
on the perspective of the field of strategic management. 
They argue that a multidisciplinary view will limit 
discussion to fundamental differences in definitions and 
assumptions. But the differences in definitions and 
14 
assumptions are not fundamental. The following 
literature review yields some appreciation of the 
commonality in measurement processes. The same essential 
structure underlies measurement processes in various 
settings: decision loops incorporate perception and 
social cognition processes that are themselves decisions. 
Different fields of study are undergoing parallel 
development of similar concepts, with similar issues 
arising. Venkatraman and Ramanujam endorse Hofer's 
observation that "...different fields of study can and 
should use different measures of organization performance 
because of the differences in their research questions" 
(Hofer, 1983: 44; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986: 802). 
This should not be accepted to mean that measures 
available to different fields are to be considered 
mutually exclusive. Many published papers amount to 
introduction of concepts and measures to one field that 
were developed in another. The concerns of strategic 
managment properly encompass the range of other 
disciplines and a variety of measures. 
Stakeholders1 Decisions 
Many groups of decision makers, each with different 
interests, are concerned with strategic performance. 
Stakeholders include labor, suppliers, customers, 
15 
creditors, boards of directors, management, governments, 
and the communities in which an organization operates. 
Among stakeholders, boards of directors are expected 
to decide the compensation of top executives, holding 
them accountable to shareholders for the performance of 
the organization (Cook, 1981; Mace, 1971). Incentive 
compensation plans are common, and salaries, fringe 
benefits, bonuses, and the value of stock options 
generally vary with the company's stock price (Rankin, 
1982). However, boards frequently fail to hold 
management accountable (Kerr and Bettis, 1987: 645, 658), 
tending to grant "stratospheric salaries" that are 
unrelated to an executive's measured performance (Vance, 
1983: 74). There is a growing interest in the impact on 
corporate strategy and performance of different 
alternative performance measures used in compensation 
plans (Kerr and Bettis, 1987; Miller and Scholes, 1982; 
Stata and Maidique, 1980). Empirical results have often 
been contradictory. 
Labor is concerned with strategic performance as 
increasing exposure of firms to international competition 
threatens job security. For example, Bethlehem Steel's 
union employees entered into concessionary contracts in 
1983 and 1986 (Fortune, 1988:39). Bethlehem's overall 
reputation was ranked 302 out of 306 companies in 
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Fortune's 1987 survey, despite recent dramatic moves to 
improve their competitive position. 
Suppliers, investors, creditors, and communities all 
look at an organization's reputation and performance for 
assurance of its continued viability. This fundamental 
relationship leads to the first three general hypotheses: 
reputation may be expected to be related to past, 
present, and future performance. (See Exhibit 1 for the 
complete statement of general and specific hypotheses. 
Exhibit 2 provides a diagrammatic summary of the 
hypotheses.) Legislators, tax authorities, bankruptcy 
courts, and regulatory agencies all consider the 
reputations and performance of firms affected by their 
decisions. 
Managers' decisions may represent the interests of 
all stakeholders (Hackett, 1985). If managers do act as 
agents for all stakeholders, one would expect that rather 
than optimizing one or a few dimensions of performance 
and reputation at the expense of others, managers would 
strive to maintain a balance among them. This suggests 
the hypothesis H4: various dimensions of corporate 
reputation are highly correlated. 
Non-stakeholders are also interested in strategic 
performance. Security analysts want an earnings number 
they can multiply by a standard price-earnings ratio to 
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arrive at an estimate of the firm's value. Economists 
want to be able to estimate a corporate contribution to 
national income. Black contends that all users of 
financial statements want an earnings figure that results 
in a constant price-earnings ratio (Black, 1980). That 
is to say, that they want to see accounting measures that 
bear a dependable current relation to market measures. 
This again suggests H3, that contemporaneous measures are 
closely related. 
Performance Measurement 
Venkatraman and Ramanujam recommend focusing on 
measurement issues in performance(1986: 802). "In its 
broadest sense, measurement is the assignment of numerals 
to objects or events according to rules" (Stevens, 1951: 
1). In essence, "measurement is a relation" (Kerlinger, 
1973: 428). "The fundamental process of measurement is 
the same" (Kerlinger, 1973: 432). With recognition of 
the similarity of measurement processes, one is free to 
focus on the contents: what is being measured, and how 
are alternative measurements related? Because the 
process of measuring and making decisions is similar in 
different contexts, we are free to look from one field of 
study to another for useful concepts. 
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Thus, a major focus of research in business policy 
and strategy is how to measure organizational 
performance (e.g. Chakravarthy, 1986; Lee and Zumwaldt, 
1981; Rumelt, 1974). Firm and management performance 
have been evaluated with a wide variety of "objective" 
(e.g. accounting and market) performance measures, but 
less frequently with "subjective" (e.g. expert ranking of 
quality of management) measures (McGuire, Schneeweis, & 
Hill, 1986). Market measures of performance, including 
stock return, have been gaining prominence in comparison 
to accounting measures of performance (Branch & Gale, 
1983; Pickens, 1985; Rappaport, 1983; Seed, 1985). 
Strategic performance has traditionally been studied 
only in terms of accounting return or stock market return 
(Branch, 1980), but there is a growing interest in risk 
as a dimension of performance (Jemison, 1987; Hayes and 
Gavin, 1982). This is associated with an increase in 
transfer of ideas and methodology from the literature of 
finance to that of strategy (e.g. Lubatkin and O'Neill, 
1987; Aaker and Jacobson, 1987). Financial theory says 
that decision makers must be rewarded for the assumption 
of risk, and that, ex ante, risk and return should be 
positively related (e.g., Brealy & Myers, 1981) as has 
been found in many studies using stock market data (e.g., 
Hurdle, 1974). However, some empirical studies have 
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found, ex post, that firms may experience a negative 
relationship between risk and accounting return (e.g., 
Bowman, 1980; Bettis and Hall, 1982). Fiegenbaum and 
Thomas (1986) review the contradictory empirical evidence 
and then, in their own study, find a negative risk-return 
relation for firms having return on equity below target 
levels and a positive association for firms with return 
on equity above target. A field study of firms in the 
banking industry found different strategies associated 
with differences in risk, but not in return on assets 
(Jemison, 1987). A study of 96 small and medium sized 
firms found centralization of authority related to risk, 
and found the relationships between risk taking and 
organization structure to be different between high 
performing and low performing firms (Miller, 1987). 
While it is expected that managers must anticipate 
increased return for them to accept higher risk, a 
dynamic game model of the agency relationship between 
corporate insiders and external claimholders illustrates 
that incentives to avoid risky debt by underinvesting may 
be moderated by anticipation of improved reputation and 
bond rating (John, Nachman, & Spatt, 1985). While the 
ex-ante forecast of return is generally based on the 
expectation that the assumption of risk requires a 
commensurate1y high return, ex-post measures of return 
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may be inconsistent, reflecting a variety of other 
influences on actual return. This suggests the need to 
evaluate H?, that measures of risk and reputation are 
related to subsequent return. 
An organization's accounting system generates 
information on several relationships that are considered 
by many to be measures of risk. This raises the 
important question of the relationship between accounting 
and market determined measures. A study of 307 firms in 
the period 1947 to 1965 found a high degree of 
contemporaneous association between accounting and market 
risk measures (Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes, 1970). The 
questions of intertemporal association and relationships 
for other firms and time periods remain. 
The distinction between systematic and unsystematic 
risk, formerly applied only to return on stock 
investments, has now been applied to analysis of 
strategic business units. Aaker and Jacobson (1987) 
found that an accounting measure of unsystematic risk had 
a significant positive relationship to ROI. As a measure 
of unsystematic risk, they used the standard error of the 
residual from estimation of accounting beta. Lubatkin 
and O'Neill (1987) found that mergers tend to be 
associated with increased levels of unsystematic and 
total risk, estimated using the market model. These 
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results are both contrary to what might be expected 
considering finance theory2. 
Many alternative measures of performance are 
available: subjective or objective, accounting or market, 
risk or return, unsystematic risk or systematic risk. If 
there is little correspondence among alternative measures 
of performance, if each measure represents different 
information, the choice of which measure or combination 
of measures researchers and decision makers use will have 
substantial effects. If some measures are found to be 
highly correlated within a time period, one or more may 
be ignored as redundant. If there are intertemporal 
relationships, if one measure predicts another, that also 
has implications. Decisions are made and research based 
on assumed relationships that must be tested. 
Reputation: Subjective Performance Measurement 
Corporate Reputation 
Corporate reputation has not received current 
scholarly attention. Treatments of corporate reputation 
generally represent two approaches. They either discuss 
the value of a good reputation, or report the results of 
a survey measuring reputation. Occasionally, the latter 
is presented as the outcome of some intervention. 
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Influences on Reputation 
Given that reputation is important, what determines 
whether a reputation will be favorable or not? The 
question of influences on reputation relates to Hi, 
concerning the relationship of reputation to prior 
performance. 
Often, results of a survey of reputations are given 
ad-hoc explanations. When IBM slipped from No. 8 to No. 
32 in overall reputation in Fortune's most recent survey, 
these explanations were offered (Schultz, 1988:32): 
Big Blue's decline reflects two years of 
disappointing profits. 
Fading demand for its mainframes and increasing 
competition from other manufacturers of 
personal computers and minicomputers have left 
IBM a little groggy. 
...(despite) tremendous progress in 
transforming us into a sharper, more 
competitive company. 
Present management is not to blame. The 
current strategy is probably far more astute 
than current profits would suggest. 
The implication is that experts' subjective 
evaluations of management depend simply on recent 
profitability, ignoring other contrary evidence. If this 
were so, then reputation would follow automatically from 
the bottom line, those concerned for their reputations 
should work to improve profitability and researchers 
could ignore measures of reputation as redundant. The 
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possible relationship of reputation to prior ROA is 
reflected in H i a. 
However, the opposite is implied concerning Bethlehem 
Steel, which had the same abyssmal overall reputation 
rating for 1987 as for 1986, despite a tremendous 
improvement in profitability (Schultz, 1988: 39). An 
alternative to H i a is H i b, that reputation is related to 
prior stock return rather than to ROA. 
Specific actions are being taken by management with 
the hope of improving reputation. Design consultants are 
engaged to help prepare annual reports that will 
encourage readers to look beyond "such facts as pretax 
profits and earnings per share" (LeMan, 1986). The 
strength of brand reputations are being exploited to 
sharpen corporate image which in turn can be used to help 
the firm break into new product sectors (Bowens, J.C., 
1986). Corporate image advertising is gaining in 
importance, according to Joseph Brouillard, whose company 
performs this service (Reed, 1984; Brouillard, 1983). 
Public relations research surveys of the many 
constituencies of a firm are conducted, and business 
decisions based on the results (ONeill, 1984). 
While actions intended to improve reputation are 
based on assumed relationships, there is evidence 
suggesting many competing influences on reputation 
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formation. In the Brouillard study, characteristics 
identified as important to a winning reputation included 
quality of products, flexibility, high-caliber 
management, honesty, customer service, market leadership, 
and good communications including effective advertising 
(Marketing News, 1986). Another study found that 
favorable customer assessment of the quality or products 
and services provided an average improvement in corporate 
image of 16% (Lewis, 1985). A survey of community 
leaders by the Center for Corporate Community Relations 
indicated that firms that were active in the community 
were rated highly on nine dimensions that included 
executive leadership and general reputation (Personnel 
Journal, 1987). This suggests that, among the dimensions 
of reputation in the Fortune survey, corporate and social 
responsibility should be significantly related to quality 
of management. These studies together recommend 
evaluation of H4, concerning the relations among the 
various dimensions of reputation. 
A survey of 235 firms found that corporate 
reputation, as measured by the Fortune survey, differed 
with regard to firm's implementation of human resource 
succession systems (Friedman, 1986). Implications were 
drawn for improving management of succession systems. A 
national policy study by the Work In America Institute 
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recommended employment security as an integral part of 
corporate strategy for improving a company's performance 
and reputation (Roscow and Zager, 1985). 
While corporate reputation has received little 
explicit sholarly attention, extensive research has been 
conducted in the closely related fields of perception, 
attribution, and social categorization. 
Social Cognition 
Social cognition is the study of how people make 
sense of other people and themselves (Fiske and Shelley, 
1984). Reputation grows out of this sense-making 
activity. Much of corporate reputation, especially 
quality of management, is about other people. 
Corporate reputation does include dimensions such as 
product quality, however. Reputation for product quality 
likely reflects social influences on cognition. The 
process of cognition, and group influences on cognition, 
have similarities, whether the object of cognition is a 
person or not. Perhaps the definition of social 
cognition should be broadened to include study of social 
influences in cognition of objects in addition to people. 
As a field of study, social cognition has grown to 
incorporate many related subjects, including attribution, 
social categorization, and social perception. Each of 
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these subjects will be considered briefly in its relation 
to corporate reputation. 
Perception 
Subjective measures of firm performance are based on 
individuals' perceptions. In this study, Fortune 
magazine's annual survey of corporate reputations 
represents experts' perceptions. Four constructs from 
the literature of perception (cf., Schneider, Hastorf, 
and Ellsworth, 1979; Dember, 1964; Weiner, 1947; Arbib, 
1977) are useful in the present study; perceptual lag, 
difference threshold, halo effect, and selective 
perception. These are discussed below. 
Perceptual lag is the delay between an event and the 
observer's awareness of the event. Kerr and Bettis 
(1987:648) observed that three studies of the 
relationship between compensation and stock return 
(Benston, 1985; Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Murphy, 1985) 
all erroneously measured a CEO's compensation as the sum 
of salary payments and bonus awards distributed in a 
given year: 
To the extent such compensation is based on 
performance, bonus awards at the end of year t 
represent a board's perception of a CEO's 
performance in year t. Salary payments 
distributed over year t, however, are based on 
a board’s perceptions of a CEO's performance in 
‘the previous year, t-1. 
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This implies perceptual lags on the part of the board 
that are less than one year: at the end of a year the 
board is aware of the executive's performance during that 
year. However, if the board's perceptions of management 
are partly based on accounting measures rather than on 
direct observation of the CEO's behavior, there is a 
further delay: management's actions may not result in 
accounting performance for years. 
Another perceptual delay may be introduced if 
management performance is evaluated on the basis of 
market measures: stock price changes depend on 
investors's perceptions. However, the efficient-markets 
hypothesis (cf. Fama, 1976) states that security prices 
instantly reflect all available information. Bethlehem 
Steel's reputation was ranked 302 out of 306 companies in 
Fortune's 1987 survey, despite recent dramatic moves to 
improve their competitive position. For example, 
Bethlehem has reduced its operating costs by over $130 
per ton, to about $400; they have almost doubled 
productivity in tons per plant employee; they have spent 
over $2 billion in modernization since 1981, so that 80% 
of their flat-rolled steel is continuously cast, up from 
23% in 1982; income from steel operations has improved by 
more than $230 million over 1986 (Fortune, 1988:39). 
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There is strong indication of a perceptual lag in Bethlem 
Steel's continued low reputation. Walter F Williams, the 
CEO, stated "the whole steel industry has to communicate 
our story better to the public and to our employees." 
Perceptual lag would be reflected in support for Hi and 
lack of support for H3: reputation would be found to be 
related to prior performance and not related to 
contemporaneous performance. 
Difference threshold has been defined as "the least 
change in stimulation that can be detected when the 
system is already being stimulated" (Dember, 1964). For 
example, an expert who is continually informed of the 
performance of firms in an industry will not perceive a 
change in that performance which is below a certain 
magnitude. This likely will result in some stability of 
experts' perceptions in the Fortune survey, because only 
noticeable changes cause revision of perceptions. 
Resistance of perceptions to revision would make it less 
likely that significant relations would be found to 
performance, and increase the likelihood that and 
would be rejected. 
The halo effect influences perceptions when a single 
characteristic overrides assessment of an individual's 
other characteristics (Griffin & Moorhead, 1986: 79). In 
a classic study, Asch (1946), formed two groups of people 
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and gave one group a list of personality traits 
containing the word "warm" and the other group an 
identical list containing the word "cold." Both groups 
were asked to further describe the individual whose 
traits had been listed. People who worked with the list 
which contained the word warm said the individual must be 
humorous, intelligent, and popular. The other group said 
the person was serious and aloof, and did not have many 
friends. The halo effect may have a serious impact on 
performance evaluations in organizations (Bernardin & 
Beatty, 1984). 
The perception that management had accomplished a 
high ROA might lead one to assume the company had a high 
degree of ability to attract, develop, and keep talented 
employees. Alexander and Bucholtz (1978) and Bowman and 
Ha ire (1975) have suggested that social responsibility 
may be indicative of management skill which may carry 
over into other management areas. Cornell and Shapiro 
(1986) suggest that reputation gained from performance on 
one set of implicit claims may influence customers' 
willingness to pay for another set of implicit claims. 
The result of a halo effect might be a high degree of 
correlation among the perceived attributes in the Fortune 
survey, representing acceptance of H4. 
30 
Selective perception is allowing current needs and 
past experiences to partly determine what persons pay 
attention to and what they perceive. The Fortune survey 
was sent to "senior executives, outside directors, and 
financial analysts." Each of them is involved in 
somewhat different decisions. Each decision is based on 
that person's perceptions of firms in the industry. So 
each person can be expected to attend somewhat 
differently to available information. The Fortune 
experts' perceptions would likely be different from those 
of consumer advocates, for example. Since the Fortune 
sample is to some degree homogeneous, one might expect 
respondents as a group to base their perceptions more on 
certain objective performance measures than on others. 
This would lead one to expect that experts' perceptions 
would be more closely related to some measures of prior 
performance than to others, and that those perceptions 
would be more predictive of some than of others. This 
suggestion is the basis for each of the specific 
hypotheses. 
Attribution 
Closely related to the process of perception is 
attribution. Attribution is the attempt to assess and 
evaluate people based upon their behavior (Kelly, 1973). 
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To understand events, people develop their own implicit 
theories of behavior. Attribution theory began with the 
work of Fritz Heider (1958), who believed that people 
have a natural tendency to see events in terms of causal 
relationships. Calder identified attribution theory as a 
conceptual base for studies of leadership (Calder, 1977). 
The process of attribution is pervasive as 
stakeholders, managers, subordinates, competitors, 
suppliers, buyers, and regulators all base their 
decisions in part on their attributions of causality to 
one another. "A favorable stock market evaluation of 
upper-level management justifies attractive managerial 
compensation packages, keeps shareholders happy, allows 
easier access to capital, facilitates relatively 
inexpensive acquisitions, and defends against takeovers 
(Branch and Gale, 1983: 41)." 
A number of studies have looked at relationships 
involving performance and attributions of leadership 
(Butterfield, Powell, & Mainiero, 1978; Lord, Binning, 
Rush, & Thomas, 1978; Rush, Thomas, & Lord, 1977, 
Phillips and Lord, 1981). Butterfield and Powell (1981) 
manipulated performance descriptions and found this 
explained nearly half of the variance in attributions of 
leadership style. 
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An organization's performance is often seen as caused 
by the quality of its management, it is attributed to the 
organization's managers. Experts' evaluations of quality 
of management in the Fortune survey are attributions. 
Quality of management is an important consideration in 
investor decisions (Graham et al, 1962). A Harris poll 
found that major institutional investors considered the 
quality of management to be the single most important 
criterion in the selection of stocks (Louis Harris and 
Associates, 1975). Thus stock price can be seen to 
depend on a process of attribution. Firms perceived as 
excellent may have superior access to capital necessary 
to facilitate favorable future performance. However, 
Granatelli and Martin (1984) found that the stock market 
returns of "well managed" firms did not outperform a 
portfolio of randomly selected companies from the same 
industries. 
Boje and Whetten (1981) studied the attribution of 
influence in interorganizational networks. They found 
that strategy, constraints, and centrality were 
significantly related to attributed influence. 
Several constructs from attribution theory are 
useful. First, the covariance principle states that we 
attribute the cause of an action to the one factor with 
which it most strongly covaries (Kelley, 1967). Second, 
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internal versus external attribution refers to whether 
the cause is seen as being within or outside the person. 
The discounting principle states that our confidence in 
an internal attribution is lowered, or discounted, to the 
extent that plausible external explanations are also 
present (Kelley, 1971) . 
Attributions are based on three types of information. 
Distinctiveness information indicates how prominent a 
factor is. Consensus information indicates whether other 
individuals in the situation are associated with the same 
results. Consistency information indicates whether the 
association is stable over time. An attribution of the 
quality of management of a firm will depend on all of 
these sources of information, and thus on the 
relationships with alternative measures of performance. 
These relationships will be evaluated with H ]_. 
Perception and attribution are important in 
compensation decisions, because a frequent concern is 
whether the success or failure of a strategy was manager- 
derived or due to factors unrelated to the actions of the 
management. 
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Accounting Measurement of Performance 
Advantages 
In a review of selected literature of organizational 
performance, accounting based measures were found to be 
dominant (McGuire, Schneeweis, and Hill, 1986). 
Accounting measures have an advantage for research in 
that they are easily available from corporate sources and 
commonly available data bases. Accounting data is 
available at the business unit level, while stock market 
data is limited to the corporate level. Accounting 
measurements are certified as conforming to generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which are 
established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB). Accounting data are "primary" data in the sense 
that they are direct measurements of the organization, 
undistorted by a further level of judgement. An 
important question is whether stock market measures, 
being partly based on accounting measures, represent a 
correction for accounting bias, or the introduction of a 
further bias. 
Disadvantages 
The potential for bias in accounting measures has 
been well documented by Briloff (1981;1972), Branch 
(1986) and Beaver and Dukes (1973). While 
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accountants should strive to calculate an accounting 
income which accurately reflects economic income, many 
perceptions and arbitrary judgments are necessary in 
doing so, and there are many pressures and opportunities 
for distortion (Getschow, 1980). Among areas of 
discretion are the allocation of receipts and 
expenditures, choice of methods of depreciation, 
determination of pension fund obligations, valuation of 
inventories and other assets, how to consolidate the 
financial statements of merged firms, and selection among 
alternative international accounting standards by 
multinational firms (McGuire, Schneeweis, and Hill, 
1986:134). 
Aaker and Jacobson (1987) note that ROI is widely 
used in practice, which suggests that reputation would be 
most closely related to ROA, as stated in Hla. Scholars 
have strongly criticized ROI (Fisher & McGowan, 1983; 
Solomon, 1971; Harcourt, 1965): the return in the 
numerator is not necessarily related to the investment in 
the denominator. 
The accounting system reports only financial 
transactions, while ignoring other important business 
events such as the failure to preserve assets, decisions 
to downgrade product quality, and technological changes 
that make equipment obsolete (Curtis, 1985). Accounting 
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rules do not allow capitalization of expenses for less 
tangible assets, such as product quality, reputation, 
product portfolio, technological base, and human 
development. The former CEO of General Electric, Ralph 
Cordiner, recommends that several measures of strategic 
performance be looked at simultaneously, including market 
position, technological leadership, personnel 
development, productivity, and employee attitudes. This 
suggests that measures of reputation will be different 
from accounting measures of performance, a suggestion 
that will be evaluated with H\ and H2. 
Market Measurement of Performance 
Several scholars have recommended the application of 
finance theory and market measures of performance to 
questions of strategic management research and practice 
(e.g. Rappaport, 1981,1983; Johnson, Natarajan & 
Rappaport, 1985). They argue that market measures of 
firm performance are better than accounting measures, and 
that finance theory and risk analysis should be used to 
guide strategic choice. This leads to consideration of 
H1 &» that reputation is related to prior total stock 
return. 
Several recent strategic management studies have used 
finance based methodologies such as the Capital Asset 
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Pricing Model (CAPM) (e.g. Kudla, 1980; Branch and Gale, 
1983; Seed, 1985; and Chakravarthy & Singh, forthcoming). 
Some research uses stock price data without reliance on 
finance theory (Bourgeois, 1985). A review of recent 
published research in several management and strategy 
journals (Academy of Management Journal, Academy of 
Management Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, 
California Management Review, Journal of Business 
Strategy, Journal of Management, Management Science, 
Planning Review, Strategic Management Journal) finds 
market data used to address a wide range of topics, 
including the usefulness of strategic planning, 
implications of market share, generic strategies, 
corporate directors, managment turnover, acquisitions, 
buyer/seller power, distinctive competence, managerial 
style, and organizational goals (Bromiley, Govekar, and 
Marcus, forthcoming). 
The CAPM resolves several methodological difficulties 
in the use of accounting-based performance figures (Fama, 
1976)3. It is not an ad hoc model, but is a fully 
specified equilibrium model of a firm's stock return 
(Fama, 1976). Tests have shown that in setting the 
market value of firms, investors adjust for differences 
in firms' accounting procedures (Fama, 1976; Brealey & 
Myers, 1984: 64-81, 248-257). Investors are thought to 
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immediately evaluate the impact of management change on a 
firm's future earnings, so that other events do not 
confound the effect. This suggests that market measures 
may better predict future accounting performance than 
will accounting or reputation measures, a suggestion 
evaluated under H£. 
There is rapidly increasing interest in risk in the 
management literature (March and Shapira, 1987; Jemision, 
1987; Crouch and Wilson, 1982). Again, classical 
decision theory says that choices are made among 
alternative actions on the basis of the mean (expected 
value) and variance (risk) of the probability 
distribution of possible outcomes (Arrow, 1965). Most 
authors assume that individuals are risk averse, and so 
must be compensated for assuming additional risk with 
commensurate additional return (Ross, 1981). There is 
contradictory evidence, however, in studies of mergers 
(Brenner and Shapira, 1983; Mueller, 1969), and in an 
inter-industry study of the risk-return relationship 
(Bowman, 1980). There are open questions about the 
relationship of risk aversion to adversity (March and 
Shapira, 1987; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Managers 
believe that fewer risks should, and would, be taken when 
things are going well. They expect riskier choices to be 
made when an organization is "failing" (MacCrimmon and 
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Wehrung, 1986). However, there is evidence that wealth 
rather than adversity leads to risk taking and innovation 
(Hamilton, 1978; Mansfield, 1968; Brinton, 1938). Again, 
in considering H ^ this study will evaluate possible 
relations between risk and subsequent return. Managers 
appear to depart from the prescriptions of decision 
theory without justification, and the quality of their 
decisions might be improved by training (March and 
Shapira, 1987: 1415). 
The CAPM implies that investors price an asset to 
receive an expected return on a security E(R.) as 
specified in equation (1) (Lee, 1985: 223): 
E(Ri) « Rf + CE(Rm) - Rf]Pi Cl) 
where: Rf = The riskless rate of return. 
E(R ) = The expected return on the market stock 
m portfolio. 
p. = The regression coefficient, which is equal 
1 to the ratio of the covariance of the 
return on security i with the return on 
the market portfolio normalized by the 
variance of the return on the market 
portfolio. 2 
(i-e-’ = °im/0 
Systematic Risk: Beta 
Thus, the expected return on any security is composed 
of two parts, the risk-free rate of return, and a risk 
premium. The risk premium is a proportion, P-, of the 
40 
excess of market return, Rm, over the risk free rate, Rf. 
The firm's beta coefficient, (3, summarizes the 
relationship between its stock return, and that of the 
market portfolio. This suggests (3 i s a meaningful 
measure for strategic management. As the return on the 
market portfolio changes, the firm's return changes at 
the rate beta; the change in the firm's return will be 
beta times the change in the return of the market 
portfolio. If a firm's beta is greater than one, and the 
market falls, the firm's stock price will fall more than 
proportionately. Thus, assuming a fully diversified 
portfolio, beta is the relevant measure of risk, and 
determines the return of a security: it will earn the 
riskless rate plus some compensation for its risk. This 
relationship will be evaluated with H 2 b. Beta is 
referred to as "systematic risk," because it is that part 
of a firm's risk that is directly related to changes in 
the return of the market as a whole. 
Unsystematic Risk: Mean Square Error (MSE) 
Beta, or systematic risk, is that part of a 
security's risk which cannot be eliminated. In addition, 
there is an unsystematic component which can be 
eliminated when that security is held in combination with 
other securities in a diversified portfolio. The market 
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model expresses the return on any asset at a point in 
time, R-t, as a linear function of the market return, 
Rmt, plus a random error component, e-t (Lee, 1985:225)4: 
R i t a • + b • R . + e •. 1 l mt it (2) 
Using equation (2), the market model, total variance 
c 
for the ith asset (o.) can be decomposed as: 
2 2 2 2 
o, = b.o (R ) + a . (3) i i' '"nr “ei 
So the total risk or total variance of a security is 
the sum of a systematic component, b. times the variance 
of the market return, and an unsystematic component, the 
variance of the error term, called the "mean square 
error" (MSE). It can be shown that b. in Eq. (3) is the 
same as p . in Eq. (1), the CAPM. 
Stock Return 
While the market model (2) allows decomposition of 
risk into systematic and unsystematic components, it also 
decomposes total stock return into three components: firm 
specific return, a. or "alpha"; return due to general 
market movements, b^R t, and a residual error component, 
e-t or "residuals". Alpha is the return that a firm 
obtains in excess of that due to general market 
movements. The second term, b.R t, is the firm's share 
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of general market movement. Residuals are random changes 
in return, the difference between observed return and 
return predicted by the linear relationship between the 
firm's total return and that of the market. 
Abnormal Return Model 
It has been argued that if stock price data is to be 
used, event studies are the appropriate methodology (Kerr 
and Bettis, 1987: 652). Finance theory states that stock 
price incorporates information and expectations about the 
future prospects of the firm. Accepting that the price 
continuously incorporates these expectations, the impact 
of a particular factor can only be determined by 
examining changes that could not reasonably have been 
anticipated by the market. To distinguish the effect of 
an event on a stock's returns, the researcher must 
separate the returns that would have been expected 
without the event (predicted or normal returns) from 
those attributable to the event (prediction error or 
abnormal returns) . 
Brown and Warner (1980: 206) note the three major 
techniques for estimating abnormal returns. The first is 
mean adjusted return, in which the average return on a 
stock outside the period of interest is subtracted from 
the observed return in the period of interest. The 
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second is called market and risk adjusted return, or 
simply "abnormal return." Rearranging Eq. (2) to solve 
for e. yields: 
e i t + b (4) 
This form is called the "abnormal return model," and 
has been used in numerous event studies in both economics 
and finance literature (Morse, 1982;Fama, 1976). It is 
"abnormal," in the sense that it is the difference 
between the observed return, R-t, and the expected 
return, (a. + b-R ^). In applying this model to an 
event, a. and b. are estimated in the period preceding 
the event, and e. t, the prediction error, is calculated 
after the event. 
The third technique is called market adjusted return, 
and differs from market and risk adjusted return in that 
a is constrained to equal zero, and (3 is constrained to 
equal one (Brown and Warner, 1980: 208)^. 
Morse found that the capital markets are highly 
efficient in the sense that significant stock price 
changes, and abnormal returns, were observed in the days 
surrounding companies' announcements of relevant events. 
It is telling that "surrounding" means before as well as 
after the public announcements that inform those who are 
44 
not inside traders. Relevant events include dividend 
increases, product sales, favorable and unfavorable 
earnings forecasts, acquisition and construction 
projects, and stock splits. 
In management studies, the abnormal return model has 
recently been used to study the relationship between 
executive compensation and stock performance (Kerr and 
Bettis, 1987), the effects of strikes on firm stock 
performance (Newmann, 1980), and the effects of 
management strategic planning on firm stock value (Kudla, 
1981). Again, the effect of reputed quality of 
management on subsequent performance will be evaluated 
with H?. In light of the foregoing review, it may be 
expected that measures of risk will be found to be 
significantly related to subsequent performance. 
CAPM: Problems 
While the market model is generally regarded as a 
pure positive prediction model, there are statistical and 
theoretical problems (Black and Jensen, 1972; Brown & 
Warner, 1984: 166-178). Use of the market return as a 
measure of performance does assume that investors 
evaluate firms appropriately. Managers may feel that 
investors are inaccurate or uninformed, but the market 
reaction can correct for some manager biases in 
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accounting. Because they represent total firm 
performance, market measures are too aggregate to apply 
to evaluation of individual projects which may represent 
strategic moves. Finally, the use of market return and 
risk measures implies the manager himself or herself is 
acting for the benefit of fully diversified investors, 
who are immune to the unsystematic component of risk. To 
the degree that the manager is concerned with 
undiversified investors, including the firm and self, 
then total risk may be a better measure of firm risk due 
to strategic management. 
Managers try to avoid exposure to unsystematic risk 
by managing well and by choosing to work for businesses 
that have low unsystematic risk (Aaker and Jacobson, 
1987). Shareholders can compose diversified portfolios, 
but other stakeholders are concerned for unsystematic 
risk, and managers represent them as well. So high 
quality of management should be associated with low 
unsystematic risk. For management to accept increases to 
unsystematic risk, they should require higher expected 
return. 
There are several reasons to question the assumed 
efficiency of capital markets (Bromily, Govekar, and 
Marcus, 1987: 20). Investors tend to overreact to events 
(e.g. de Bondt & Thaler, 1985), events have different 
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effects depending on the size of firms, stock returns may 
be reduced when inflation is significant, there are 
weekend and day of week effects, investors' actual 
portfolios include assets other than stocks, and 
investors may perceive an intrinsic value in dividends. 
Comparison of Measures 
A comparison of several aspects of accounting, 
market, and qualitative measures of performance is 
summarized in Table 2-1 (all tables are placed at the 
ends of their respective chapters). It is noteworthy 
that across the three types of measures, subjectivity is 
a matter of degree. With nominally qualitative measures, 
experts are free to form their own opinions, knowing they 
will remain "experts" while those opinions are generally 
considered creditable. Market measures depend on 
investors' evaluations. Investors evaluate the prospects 
of a stock with a more purely pecuniary interest, and 
that may make them more objective. They are advised by 
the "experts," however, and so investors own opinions 
cannot be much more "objective." Stock market crashes 
certainly do not reflect changes in the economic value of 
firms, but in perceptions, and especially in the 
attribution of others' perceptions and resultant future 
price movements. Finally, there is also subjectivity in 
47 
accounting. The wide lattitude for discretion in 
accounting measurement was discussed above. 
There is substantial controversy regarding the 
relationship between various strategic performance 
measures and top executives' compensation. Empirical 
results have been inconsistent. Some researchers have 
reported a strong relationship between stock return and 
compensation while others report no relationship 
(Murphy, 1985; Redling, 1981). Baumol (1959) suggested 
that executives are compensated on the basis of 
organization size rather than stock return, and so 
attempt to maximize sales while maintaining a minimum 
profit level. Following this suggestion, research has 
found compensation to be positively related to sales and 
unrelated to net profit (Meeks & Whitting, 1975; Cosh, 
1975; Ciscel, 1974; McGuire, Chiu, and Elbing, 1962) 
Lewellen and Huntsman (1970) found the opposite: that 
compensation was strongly related to profits and 
unrelated to sales. In light of this controversy, it 
will be interesting to observe the object of 
compensation: the relation of quality of management to 
performance. 
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Peters and Waterman (1982) used both objective and 
subjective measures to identify excellent corporations. 
Objective measures used were compound asset growth, 
compound equity growth, ratio of market to book value, 
average return on total capital, average return on 
equity, and average return on sales. Subjective measures 
represented innovativeness. Select industry experts were 
asked to rate the companies in their industries on their 
20-year record of product or service innovation and on 
their ability to adapt rapidly to changing industry 
conditions. 
Peters and Waterman's purpose was not to compare 
approaches to evaluating performance, but to identify 
excellent firms. Their validation was subjective and 
partial (Carroll, 1983). Similarly, Chakravarthy used 
Peters and Waterman's assignation of excellence, and also 
consulted the Fortune ratings for the same reason: to 
identify a sample of excellent firms (Chakravarthy, 
1986). Both studies simply accepted the experts' 
evaluations as further evidence of excellence. 
Industry Differences 
Joan Woodward (1965) found that organizational design 
depended on technology. An industry can often be 
characterized by its technology. Woodward found that 
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successful small batch and continuous-process plants had 
flexible management structures while successful mass 
production operations were rigidly structured. More 
recent investigations have offered some support for this 
technological imperative (Fry, 1982). 
A major contribution to the literature of strategic 
management is Michael Porter's competitive strategy 
approach, based on industrial organization (Porter, 
1980). Industrial organization economists have developed 
insights into the range of performance available in 
certain industries (e.g., Caves, Gale, and Porter, 1974; 
Scherer, 1970; Ravenscraft 1983). 
Porter says that the industry is the appropriate 
level of analysis for strategy. An industry is defined 
as a group of competitors together with their suppliers, 
buyers, substitutes, and potential entrants. The best 
choice among alternative strategies will depend on the 
relative power of the interacting firms, on the potential 
rate of growth, the technological sophistication, the 
rate of innovation, and management capability. 
The importance of each of these factors will be 
different for different industries. For example, are 
there many capable managers, or just a few? If the 
potential growth rate in an industry is low and there are 
few opportunities for innovation, established firms with 
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substantial assets will easily be able to protect their 
positions while enjoying relatively high returns and low 
risk. If potential for innovation and growth in an 
industry are high, a large amount of fixed assets may 
limit adaptability, and successful firms may require the 
highest quality of management and the assumption of a 
high degree of risk. 
Thus, it is likely that some relationships among 
measures of reputation, risk, and performance are 
specific to industries and to time periods. For the 
period 1971-1977, the mean dividend yield was, as 
expected, significantly greater and the mean beta 
significantly lower for utilities and banks than for 
industrial firms (McGuire, Schneeweis, and Hill; 1986). 
Regulation insulates utilities and banks from general 
market movements. In addition to lower systematic risk, 
utilities and banks experienced lower unsystematic (MSE) 
and total risk (standard deviation of total stock 
return). While utilities experienced lower total and 
systematic risk, they also had higher market return. 
This inverse relationship between risk and return is 
reasonable in light of the poor performance of the market 
during this period. The different risk and return 
characteristics of non-industrial firms makes it likely 
that experts would perceive them differently and that 
52 
this would show up in different relationships between 
reputation and performance for industrial and non¬ 
industrial firms. 
Aaker and Jacobson (1987) found that both systematic 
and unsystematic risk were related to ROI. However, the 
association of unsystematic risk with return was found to 
be less uniform across industries. "It is positive and 
significant for consumer goods businesses and for 
businesses producing components, materials, and supplies, 
but small and insignificant for capital goods businesses 
(Aaker and Jacobson, 1987: 287)." 
In a replication of Mintzberg's study of the nature 
of managerial work, Kurke and Aldrich found, by combining 
their results with Mintzberg's, that management behavior 
was more similar between organizations within an industry 
than between organizations in different industries (Kurke 
and Aldrich, 1983:982). If there are industry specific 
differences in management behavior, there are likely to 
be differences in experts' perceptions and attributions 
concerning that behavior. 
In testing the relationship between stock price and 
compensation, Murphy (1985) considered an industry- 
relative performance measure, in which a firm's return 
was compared to the average return of its industry. 
Results showed that different performance measures 
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affected various components of compensation differently, 
and that raw rates of return were preferrable for 
predicting overall top management compensation. 
Hypotheses H]a and H2c are further evaluated with the 
data divided into groups of industrial and non-industrial 
firms, as described in Chapter I I I. 
Interdependence of Perceptions 
Perceptions of managerial and firm performance may be 
based on perceptions of strategic performance. 
Likewise, the interdependence of these perceptions and 
actual accounting and market performances has important 
implications for strategic management decisions. 
As Branch and Gale point out: 
While the stock market does tend to reward 
companies for high ROE (profitability), growth, 
R&D intensity, payout, and interest coverage 
(low risk), the policy implications of these 
(separate) relations are less clear. For 
example, a company that sought to increase its 
growth at the expense of its ROE might 
adversely affect its stock price. Moreover, 
the trade offs between R&D intensity and ROE; 
payout and growth; etc., should not be ignored. 
Investors do not reward companies for high ROE, 
interest coverage, R&D intensity, or payout per 
se. Rather such characteristics are preferred 
only when they are viewed as forecasters of a 
favorable future. 
The aim of academic research, then,is the same as 
that of practicing managers, boards of directors, and 
investors: to determine the causal relationships between 
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quality of management, strategy, and strategic 
performance; to develop better attributions. 
Classification of Measurements for Strategy Research 
While finance theory has tended to concentrate on a 
single measure of performance, the strategic management 
literature is developing a multi-trait perspective on 
performance (Lenz, 1981; Venkataraman & Ramanujam, 1986). 
Venkatraman and Ramanujam adopt a two dimensional 
cl assificatory scheme for the measurement of business 
performance in strategy research. Performance may be 
financial or operational; based on primary or secondary 
sources. 
Financial performance "centers on the use of simple 
outcome-based financial indicators that are assumed to 
reflect the fulfillment of the economic goals of the 
firm...which has been the dominant model in empirical 
strategy research (p.803)." Financial performance 
indicators include accounting-based measures such as 
sales growth, profitability (e.g. return on assets), and 
earnings per share. With the current view that market- 
based measures may be more important than accounting- 
based measures, financial performance may be represented 
by measures like total stock return. 
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Operational performance represents a broader, non- 
financial conceptualization of business performance. 
Operational performance is represented by such measures 
as "market-share, new product introduction, product 
quality, marketing effectiveness, manufacturing value- 
added, and other measures of technological efficiency 
within the domain of business performance" (Venkatraman K 
Ramanujam, 1986: 804). Product quality, and 
innovativeness (new product introduction), are among the 
dimensions of the Fortune survey. 
All of the dimensions of reputation would be 
considered measures of operational performance, except 
value as a long-term investment, financial soundness, and 
use of corporate assets. All of the market and 
accounting measures in the present study would be 
considered measures of financial performance. 
Venkatraman and Ramanujam futhcr characterize data by 
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its source as "primary" or "secondary" (1986: 804), 
Primary data is collected directly from "organizations," 
Secondary data Is "from publicly available records." Hy 
these definitions, primary and secondary are not mutually 
exclusive categories: much data, such as financial 
statements, are collected directly from the organizations 
and publicly available. Venkatraman arid Ramanujam 
Identify COMPUSTAT data, used In the present study, as a 
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secondary data source, and PIMS (Product Impact of 
Marketing Strategies) data as primary data. But 
COMPUSTAT accounting data is obtained directly from 
companies, and made available to subscribers unchanged. 
Many identical measurements could be obtained from either 
PIMS or COMPUSTAT. 
Still, the spirit of the distinction is a desirable 
one: secondary data should be distinguished not by being 
public, but by being derived from primary data through 
some further processing that changes it. In the present 
study, survey data on corporate reputation are clearly 
secondary: reputation is an indirect measure of a firm, 
changed by the filtering of experts' cognitive processes. 
A more difficult question concerns market measures. Are 
they primary or secondary? By the revised definition, 
they are considered secondary measures of organizations, 
because like reputation, they are derived from primary 
data processed with a variety of influences, including 
reputation, in the cognitions of investors. 
The authors draw three implications from their 
classification of measures. First, conceptualizations of 
performance that combine financial and operational 
indicators are preferable because they employ a broader 
construct space, i.e. they provide additional 
information. The present study will evaluate this claim 
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by determining whether various financial and operating 
indicators from secondary sources are strongly related. A 
highly correlated measure does not offer new information. 
This relates to H4: the various dimensions of corporate 
reputation are highly correlated. 
Lack of a significant relationship between measures 
may mean independent information, a contribution to a 
more comprehensive causal schema. To know a firm's net 
income, by itself, is to know nothing about the firm. 
Any stakeholder requires additional knowledge of 
performance to make a competent decision. Financial 
analysis traditionally adds meaning to isolated numbers 
from a single firm by combining them in ratios, trend 
analysis, and industry comparisons. The present study 
performs a similar task at a higher level of analysis by 
evaluating relations among measures across firms, to see 
how reputation may add a further dimension of 
understanding to market and finance measures. 
The recent move to adopt other theories including 
finance theory to strategic management research needs to 
be followed by examination of the relationships of those 
theories to existing strategic management theory, so that 
they can be incorporated and development can proceed. 
This study will consider both subjective and objective 
measures of management and firm performance and analyze 
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their interrelationships. The significance of these 
interrelationships for management's strategic decisions 
will be discussed in the final chapter. 
Specific Hypotheses and Rationale 
From the diverse literature relating to reputation 
and performance, some major issues have led to the 
present hypotheses. The first generalized hypothesis is: 
Hi: Corporate reputation is significantly 
related to prior strategic performance. 
The first hypothesis follows from the fundamental 
nature of cognition: it depends on processing of 
information from prior events. 
If H] is true, comparison of the Fortune data for one 
period with COMPUSTAT data for a prior period should 
reveal significant relationships. A variety of more 
specific alternate hypotheses are suggested by the 
literature review and the available data. A few are 
selected as especially likely or interesting, with others 
left implicit. Specific hypotheses which relate to Hi 
include: 
Hia: Experts' perceptions of quality of 
management are significantly related to prior 
ROA. 
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This follows from the prominence of ROA among various 
measures of performance. It is widely published, and 
easily understood. 
Hib: Experts' perceptions of long-term 
investment value are significantly related to 
prior total stock return. 
The questions raised about biases in accounting 
measures, and the recent high regard for market measures 
suggests that experts may be following firm's stock 
market performance in forming their perceptions. 
H2: Corporate reputation is significantly 
related to subsequent strategic performance. 
The interest that stakeholders have in an 
organization is that its performance will affect them in 
the future. That is why they search for information and 
form cognitions. This hypothesis represents the 
expectation that stakeholders are successful in this and 
that reputation is an accurate prediction of future 
performance. 
In a generalized sense, it can be said that if H2 is 
true, combining the Fortune data with the COMPUSTAT data 
should predict subsequent strategic performance better 
than the COMPUSTAT data alone. Specific hypotheses 
related to H 2 include: 
60 
H2a* Experts' perceptions of quality of 
management are a significant predictor of 
subsequent total stock return. 
This suggests that among expert perceptions, the 
explicit expectation of future investment value will be 
con firmed. 
H 2 b : Experts' perceptions of quality of 
management are a significant predictor of 
subsequent ROA while prior risk measures are 
not. 
Recent trends in research emhphasize market measures. 
Finance theory leads to the expectation that measures of 
risk will anticipate future performance. This hypothesis 
compares risk measures with experts' opinions of 
management quality for prediction ability. 
H2g: A combination of selected dimensions of 
prior reputation and risk explains more of the 
variation in subsequent ROA than does prior 
reputation or risk separately. 
There is a possibility that reputation and risk have 
independent predictive ability with respect to ROA. If 
so, then in combination, they will have increased 
explanatory power. 
Two further hypotheses derive from considering both 
of the general hypotheses. 
H3: Corporate reputation is significantly 
related to contemporaneous strategic 
performance. 
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If perceptual lag is substantial, then this 
hypothesis will not be supported. However, if reputation 
adjusts as quickly as the efficient market hypothesis 
suggests stock prices do, then this hypothesis will be 
confirmed. 
H4: The various dimensions of corporate 
reputation are highly correlated. 
This hypothesis is supported if management acts as 
agent for a variety of stakeholders, and seeks to balance 
various dimensions of performance. Reputation also 
likely reflects a halo effect. 
Exhibit 2-1 lists the hypotheses. Figure 2-2 
presents a schematic summary of the hypotheses. 
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EXHIBIT 2-1 
GENERAL AND SPECIFIC HYPOTHESES 
Hi: Corporate reputation is significantly related to 
prior strategic performance. 
Hia: Experts' perceptions of quality of 
management are significantly related to prior 
ROA. 
Hib: Experts' perceptions of long-term 
investment value are significantly related to 
prior total stock return. 
H2: Corporate Reputation is significantly related to 
subsequent strategic performance. 
H^a* Experts' perceptions of quality of 
management are a significant predictor of 
subsequent total stock return. 
H2b: Experts' perceptions of quality of 
management are a significant predictor of 
subsequent ROA while prior risk measures are 
not. 
H2c* A combination of selected dimensions of 
prior reputation and risk explains more of the 
variation in subsequent ROA than does prior 
reputation or risk separately. 
H3: Corporate reputation is significantly related to 
contemporaneous strategic performance. 
H4: The various dimensions of corporate reputation 
are highly correlated. 
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FIGURE 2-1 
SUMMARY OF STATED HYPOTHESES 
Prior Contemporaneous 
HI: 
Performance 
ROA 
Total Stock Return 
Subsequent 
Reputation 
Quality of Management 
Long Term Investment 
Value 
H 2: 
Reputation * 
Long Term Investment * 
Value 
Quality of Management * 
Quality of Management « 
+ Risk Measures 
Performance 
Total Stock Return 
ROA 
ROA 
Reputation 
i < 
Performance 
Reputation 
Reputation 
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TABLE 2-1 
COMPARISON OF 
Dimensions 
of Comparison 
measure of 
systematic 
risk 
measure of 
firm specific 
risk 
measure of 
total risk 
measure of 
return 
avai1abi1ity 
subjectivity 
MEASURES 
Accounting Market 
Measures Measures 
accounting beta beta 
Qualitative 
Measures 
mean square 
error(MSE) of 
residuals 
1everage, 
earnings 
variabi1ity, 
earnings growth 
e.g. ROA, ROE 
easy: corporate 
sources and 
data banks 
"long term 
investment 
value" 
stock market 
return, dividend 
y i el d 
easy: corporate require 
sources and data 
data banks col 1ection 
within GAAP: 
managers 
discretion on 
depreciation, 
transfer pricing, 
pricing of 
long-term assets 
and liabilities, 
allocation of 
expenses 
investors' experts 
judgements inherently 
exaggerated by subjective 
speculation 
(continued next page) 
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TABLE 2-1: (continued). 
theoretical 
basi s 
ad hoc, 
accessible 
CAPM is widely 
accepted as 
a fully 
specified 
equi1ibrium 
model of a firm's 
stock return, but 
there are 
objections 
imp1icit, 
inaccessibl e 
assumptions GAAP investors 
evaluate firms 
appropriately 
experts 
evaluate firms 
appropriately 
scope limited to 
specific entities, 
performance 
measures and 
time periods 
global, 
nearly 
instantaneous 
variable, 
narrow to 
global 
focus data collected 
for other 
purposes 
investors 
motivated by 
stock return 
variable 
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CHAPTER III 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The importance of corporate reputation in modern 
commerce is partly attributable to the great amount of 
publicity through advertising and reporting in business 
periodicals. A considerable exchange of reputation 
information is exemplified by Fortune magazine's annual 
survey of corporate reputations, one of the most 
comprehensive and widely circulated measurements of 
reputation available. The Fortune survey data 
operationally define reputation for the present study. 
Similarly, various measures of performance have gained a 
high degree of currency by virtue of their accessabi1ity 
through public sources such as the COMPUSTAT data base. 
This currency supports widespread acceptance of these 
measures as proper representations of performance. The 
data for the present study are discussed below, followed 
by the methodology employed. 
The Data 
Reputation data, including management quality, were 
obtained from Fortune magazine's annual survey of 
corporate reputations conducted for 1982 through 1984.6 
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In 1984, the survey covered the ten largest firms 
(largest by sales) in each of twenty-five industries7 and 
included 250 companies (Sellers, 1985: 18). Fortune 
polled 7,000 senior executives, outside directors, and 
financial analysts each year. The response rate was 
about 50% for each year. Respondents were asked to rate 
the ten largest companies in their industry (for 
analysts, the industry they follow) on eight attributes: 
quality of management, quality of products and services, 
innovativeness, long-term investment value, financial 
soundness, ability to attract, develop, and keep 
talented people, community and environmental 
responsibility, and use of corporate assets. Firms were 
rated on a scale of 0 (poor) to 10 (excellent). An 
average score for the eight dimensions was computed for 
each firm. 
In addition to the eight attributes measured in the 
survey, a ninth variable was calculated as the average of 
the other eight. This variable was named "average 
quality." Finally, another reputation variable was 
calculated from the Fortune data. An improvement in 
quality of management is often sought to obtain high 
performance. Marginal quality of management was computed 
as the per cent change in quality of management® from 
1982 to 1984: 
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Mm = C(M2 - M])/M2]xlOO (5) 
Fortune's is one of the most comprehensive and widely 
circulated surveys of managerial attributes available. 
Both the quality and number of respondents is comparable 
or superior to the "expert panels" usually gathered for 
such purposes. Other studies have had fewer or less 
expert respondents, or have been less broadly based. For 
example, Dess and Robinson (1985) surveyed corporate 
executives, but did not include analysts or outside 
directors. MBA students have been used (Vance, 1975; 
Alexander and Bucholtz, 1978), but they are likely less 
expert than Fortune's senior executives, financial 
analysts, or outside directors. The New York Times 
evaluated the quality of management of ten major 
companies in a telephone poll limited to MBA graduates of 
six leading schools of management (Clymer, 1987). 
Fortune had 8200 responses, while some studies have 
relied on individual experts (Vance, 1975; Moskowitz, 
1978). Chakravarthy (1986) used as the basis for his 
study of firms in the computer industry the assignation 
of excellence by Peters and Waterman (1982). They in 
turn relied on "an informed group of observers of the 
business scene." Chakravarthy also used the Fortune 
rankings to select additional excellent companies. 
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For the present study, Fortune data collected in the 
years 1982 through 1984 were used. Through this period, 
there were 98 firms that were surveyed in all three 
years, compared to 250 firms in 1984. This was due to 
firms entering or leaving the top ten in their 
industries. This is the sample that was studied. The 
sample is not random in the sense that it is comprised of 
firms continuously among the top ten in their industries. 
These firms may be different from ones that have entered 
or left this select group during the period of study, and 
from firms which have not been among the top ten in their 
industries. 
Two types of error are possible: type 1, in which the 
null hypothesis is rejected when in fact there is no 
significant relationship; and type 2, in which the null 
hypothesis is accepted when in fact there is a 
significant relationship. To reduce the possibility of 
either type of error, the sample was divided into two 
equal groups of 49 firms each, so that results for one 
group could be checked by comparison to results for 
another group. 
The two groups of firms were matched for equal 
representation of the 25 different industries and for 
overall reputation. This was done by first sorting all 
of the firms in ascending order by industry number, and 
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then sorting the firms within each industry by overall 
reputation. Then the ordered list of firms was randomly 
allocated to the two groups by selecting the first firm 
to group 1, the second to group 2, the third to group 1, 
and so on. The result was that group 1 and group 2 had 
the same number of firms in each industry when there were 
an even number of firms available from that industry in 
the sample, and a number of firms that differed by 1 when 
there were an odd number of firms in the sample (see 
Table 3-1) . 
To allow evaluation of possible industry differences 
suggested by the literature review, the two groups were 
further divided into subgroups of 39 industrial and 10 
non industrial firms. 
Accounting and market measures of firm performance 
were selected from those in the COMPUSTAT data base. 
Exhibit 3-1 defines the COMPUSTAT measures. These 
variables were chosen because of the importance they have 
been given in previous studies and in practice. 
Beta, or systematic risk, is important because the 
Sharpe-Lintner capital asset pricing model implies that 
it is the sole determinant of differences in the expected 
returns among risky capital assets. There is widespread 
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EXHIBIT 3-1 
DEFINITION OF COMPUSTAT VARIABLES 
A1pha (A). From the market model, return in excess of 
that due to general market movements (Lee, 1985). 
Assets Growth (AG). Percent change in total assets. 
AG = aTA/TA = Change in Total Assets/Total Assets 
Average Assets (AA). Beginning assets less ending assets 
divided by two. 
AA = (BA-EA)/2 = (Beginning Assets-Ending Assets)/2 
Beta (B). From the market model, the covariance of a 
stock in relation to the rest of the stock market (Downes 
and Goodman, 1985). Systematic, nondiversifiable risk 
( Lee, 1985) . 
Debt/Assets Ratio (D/A). Total debt divided by total 
assets ( Lee, 1985). 
D/A = TD/TA = Total Debt/Total Assets 
Income Growth (IG) . Percent change in income. This is 
income before extroardinary items and discontinued 
operations, after all expenses, including special items, 
income taxes, and minority interest - but before 
provisions for common and/or preferred dividends 
(Industrial Compustat, 1981). 
IG = AI/I = Change in Income/Income 
Operating Income Growth (QIG). Percent change in 
operating income. Operating income is net sales less 
cost of goods sold and operating expenses before 
deducting depreciation, amortization and depletion 
(Industrial Compustat, 1981). 
OIG = ^01/01 = Change in Operating Income/Operating 
Income 
Operating Leverage (QL). The extent to which fixed costs 
are used in a firm's operation. Breakeven analysis is 
used to measure the extent to which operating leverage is 
employed (Brigham, 1975). 
OL = (S-VC)/(S-VC-F) = (Sales-Variable Costs) 
(Sales-Variable Costs-Fixed 
Costs) 
(continued on next page) 
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EXHIBIT 3-1 (continued) . 
Residual Error (RE). From the market model, unique firm 
risk (Lee, 1985). 
Return on assets (RQA) . A measure of operating 
performance, of how well assets have been employed since 
being received by the firm (Garison, 1976). 
ROA = (NI+IE)/ATA = (Net Income + Interest Expense) 
Average Total Assets 
Sales Growth (SG) . Percent change in sales. Sales is 
gross sales and other operating revenue less discounts, 
returns, and allowances (Industrial Compustat, 1981). 
SG = aS/S = Change in Sales/Sales 
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agreement on the overriding importance of systematic risk 
in the determination of the expected return both for 
individual corporate stocks and for portfolios (Fama, 
1976). When any of the assumptions of CAPM are 
unwarranted, unsystematic (firm-specific) risk is also 
likely to affect market price (Levy, 1978). The 
unsystematic component of risk is represented by the mean 
square error of the residuals (MSE), an estimate of the 
variance of the disturbance term in the market model. 
Accounting variables were chosen to represent risk and 
return in light of their use in previous studies 
(Thompson, 1976) 
Table 3-2 is a listing of all of the variables in the 
study, noting the time period of the variable, and if it 
is a performance or risk measure. Tables 3-3 to 3-8 
contain descriptive statistics of all of the variables 
for both groups. It is apparent that the groups are 
quite similar. 
Methodo1ogy 
The hypotheses will be tested through correlation 
analysis, ANOVA, and both simple and stepwise 
regressions. Compared to ANOVA, which merely indicates 
the significance of linear relationship, regression 
analysis further indicates how the variables are related, 
and multiple regression analysis permits examination of 
the combined influence of more than one independent 
variable. 
Correlation Analysis 
A correlation coefficient is a measure of linear 
association in a bivariate population, indicating the 
degree to which variation in one variable is related to 
variation in the other (Nie et al, 1976). Correlation 
analysis was used to determine relationships among the 
eight dimensions of experts' perception. 
Analysis of Variance 
Analysis of Variance, ANOVA, was used to reveal any 
significant relationships between ROA or total stock 
return and each of the other variables. In ANOVA, the 
independent variable must be an integer-valued, nonmetric 
factor. ANOVA examines the variability of the response 
variable between samples formed on this factor relative 
to variability of the response variable within samples. 
Values of the factor correspond to categories or levels 
of a "treatment." If the samples, represented by their 
means, are "spread out" compared to the variation of 
observations within each sample, then the null 
hypothesis, that there is no difference among the means 
of populations from which the samples were taken, is 
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rejected (Miller and Wichern, 1977). If the population 
means are identical, it is unlikely that sample means 
would vary more than the observations within samples. 
Thus, if sample means are found to be significantly 
different, then the null hypothesis is rejected and one 
is led to infer that at least one of the population means 
is different from the others, that the independent and 
dependent variables are related. 
ANOVA requires integer values of independent 
variables to be used as non-metric factors. To obtain 
integer values based on the independent variable, ten 
portfolios were formed from each group by ranking firms 
by their z-scores^ on return on assets (ROA). In 
separate ANOVA's, portfolios were similarly based on 
total stock return. Ten portfolios were formed so that 
each "portfolio" contains the minimum sample of five 
firms (in the case of the tenth portfolio, four firms). 
The rank number of the portfolio then was used as the 
independent variable. Thus, if sample means on the 
response variable are found to be significantly 
different, then the null hypothesis is rejected and one 
is led to infer that at least one of the population means 
is different from the others, that there are real 
differences between firms with respect to the "response" 
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measure, when they are grouped according to the specified 
"factor." 
This approach was taken to provide a sensitive test. 
If either ROA or total stock return is significantly 
related to any of the independent variables, it will show 
up with this design. That is, if just two of the ten 
portfolios are likely drawn from different populations 
with respect to the response variable, the reported F 
probability will be significant. Thus, if there are no 
significant simple relationships found, one may have 
substantial confidence there are none. The result is 
robust in this respect. However, some type 2 errors, 
significant F probabilities when there is no real 
relationship between independent and dependent variables 
are likely. This could result from a spurious difference 
in the dependent variable between only two of the ten 
portfolios, for example. Duplication of the analysis for 
a second group of firms provides a check on this. Each 
independent variable was analyzed in a separate ANOVA, 
using the SPSS procedure "ONEWAY." Independent variables 
included all of the performance, risk, and reputation 
measures. 
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Simple Regression Analysis 
Simple regressions were performed on selected 
variables in order to further evaluate bivariate 
relationships through examining the significance of 
individual beta coefficients. The dependent variables 
considered included ROA, total stock return, and quality 
of management, representing the most important among, 
respectively, accounting, market, and reputation measures 
as determined in the literature review. For each 
dependent variable, each of four independent variables 
was considered in a simple regression: residuals (from 
the market model), standard deviation of income, quality 
of management, and beta.' 
Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis 
Preceding analyses: correlation, ANOVA, and simple 
regression, merely examined the simple bivariate 
associations among variables. Multiple regression 
analysis estimates the degrees of influence of different 
independent variables on a dependent variable. It 
furnishes tests of the statistical significance of the 
combined influences of independent variables and of the 
separate influence of each independent variable on a 
dependent variable (Kerlinger, 1973). Several stepwise 
multiple regressions were performed. In this procedure, 
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the variable that explains the greatest amount of 
variance in the dependent variable will enter first, the 
variable that explains the greatest amount of variance in 
conjunction with the first will enter second, and so on. 
In other words, the variable that explains the greatest 
amount of variance unexplained by the variables already 
in the equation enters the equation at each step. 
Questions adressed include: Which measures or 
combinations of measures best explain the variations in 
perceptions of management quality? Does management 
quality have any ability to forecast subsequent 
performance? Do measures of perceived management quality 
add to knowledge of past risk as a predictor of future 
performance? The analysis involved both leading and 
lagging the data to explore time-related interactions. 
Several possible relationships were considered, 
involving the same variables that were considered in 
simple regressions. In each stepwise regression, the 
independent variable entered first will be that which was 
most significant among those considered in simple 
repressions with that dependent variable. The statistics 
obtained will be identical. Of interest will be the 
significance and order of inclusion of remaining 
independent variables as they are added to the regression 
equation. 
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TABLE 3-1 
DATA: Representation of Firms Among Industries. 
Number 
Industry Group 1 
Number Firms 
Industrial 
20 
23 
26 
28 
29 
32 
33 
34 
36 
38 
40 
41 
42 
44 
45 
Total 
Industrial 
Non-Industrial 
91 
92 
95 
96 
97 
Total 
Non-Industrial 
Total 
Fi rms 
Number of 
Group 2 
F i rms 
2 
1 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
1 
4 
3 
2 
4 
4 
5 
3 
39 39 
3 
1 
3 
1 
2 
10 10 
49 49 
of 
3 
0 
4 
3 
3 
0 
1 
1 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
1 
3 
2 
1 
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TABLE 3-2 
LIST OF VARIABLES. 
SUBSEQUENT MARKET 
(82 TO 84 AVG.) 
ACCTG 
(82 TO 84 AVG.) 
PRIOR MARKET 
(77 TO 81 AVG.) 
P=PERFORMANCE MEASURE 
R=RISK MEASURE 
VI CUSIP NUMBER 
V2 STANDARD MARKET ADJUSTED RETURNS 
R V3 BETA 
V4 STANDARD ERROR OF BETA 
P V5 ALPHA 
V6 STANDARD ERROR OF ALPHA 
V7 RESIDUALS 
V8 MARKET RETURN 
V9 STANDARD DEVIATION OF MARKET RETURN 
P VIO TOTAL STOCK RETURN 
R Vll STANDARD DEVIATION OF TOTAL STOCK RETURN 
V12 R SQUARED 
R V13 DEBT TO ASSETS RATIO 
P V14 RETURN ON ASSETS 
P V15 AVERAGE ASSETS 
R V16 STANDARD DEVIATION OF OPERATING INCOME 
P V17 SALES GROWTH 
R V18 OPERATING LEVERAGE 
P V19 ASSETS GROWTH 
P V20 OPERATING INCOME GROWTH 
V21 STANDARD MARKET ADJUSTED RETURNS 
R V22 BETA 
V23 STANDARD ERROR OF BETA 
P V24 ALPHA 
V25 STANDARD ERROR OF ALPHA 
V26 RESIDUALS 
V27 MARKET RETURN 
V28 STANDARD DEVIATION OF MARKET RETURN 
P V29 TOTAL STOCK RETURN 
R V30 STANDARD DEVIATION OF TOTAL STOCK RETURN 
V31 R SQUARED 
(continued next page) 
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TABLE 3-2 (continued). 
FORTUNE 
(1982) 
PRIOR ACCTG 
(77 TO 81 AVG.) 
SUBSEQUENT FORTUNE 
(82 TO 84 AVG.) 
V32 QUALITY OF MANAGEMENT 
V33 QUALITY OF PRODUCTS 
V34 INNOVATION 
V35 LONG TERM INVESTMENT 
V36 FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS 
V37 ABILITY TO ATTRACT, DEVELOP, 
AND KEEP TALENTED PEOPLE 
V38 CORPORATE AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
V39 USE OF CORPORATE ASSETS 
V40 AVERAGE QUALITY 
R V41 DEBT TO ASSETS RATIO 
P V42 RETURN ON ASSETS 
P V43 AVERAGE ASSETS 
R V44 STANDARD DEVIATION OF OPERATING INCOME 
P V45 SALES GROWTH 
R V46 OPERATING LEVERAGE 
P V47 ASSETS GROWTH 
P V48 OPERATING INCOME GROWTH 
V49 QUALITY OF MANAGEMENT 
V50 QUALITY OF PRODUCTS 
V51 INNOVATION 
V52 LONG TERM INVESTMENT 
V53 FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS 
V54 ABILITY TO ATTRACT, DEVELOP, 
AND KEEP TALENTED PEOPLE 
V55 CORPORATE AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
V56 USE OF CORPORATE ASSETS 
V57 AVERAGE QUALITY 
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TABLE 3-3 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: Market and Accounting 
Performance Measures, 
1982-1984 Averages. 
Standard 
Mean Deviation 
Market Measures: 
A1 pha 
Group 1: -0.0869 1.3962 
Group 2: -0.0038 1.3964 
Total Stock Return 
Group 1: 1.3301 1.2484 
Group 2: 1.4071 1.2059 
Accounting Measures: 
Return On Assets 
Group 1: 147.71 55.40 
Group 2: 155.51 60.15 
Average Assets 
Group 1: 9299.50 12983.41 
Group 2: 7569.83 8502.23 
Sales Growth 
Group 1: -0.5535 0.1745 
Group 2: -0.5532 0.1944 
Assets Growth: 
Group 1: -0.5676 0.1745 
Group 2: -0.5293 0.1964 
Operating Income Growth: 
Group 1: -0.3978 0.3790 
Group 2: -0.3510 0.4063 
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TABLE 3-4 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: Market and Accounting 
Performance Measures, 
1977-1981 Averages. 
Standard 
Mean Deviation 
Market Measures: 
Alpha 
Group 1: -0.0928 1.1083 
Group 2: -0.0722 0.8226 
Total Stock Return 
Group 1: 0.6078 1.1619 
Group 2: 0.6668 0.9141 
Accounting Measures: 
Return On Assets 
Group 1: 164.90 58.33 
Group 2: 176.88 60.26 
Average Assets 
Group 1: 6204.95 8963.82 
Group 2: 5237.49 6017.21 
Sales Growth 
Group 1: -0.8297 0.3709 
Group 2: -0.8570 0.2308 
Assets Growth: 
Group 1: -0.8216 0.3196 
Group 2: -0.8776 0.2232 
Operating Income Growth: 
Group 1: -0.9378 0.5396 
Group 2: -1.0019 0.4396 
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TABLE 3-5 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: Market and Accounting 
Risk Measures, 
1982-1984 Averages. 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Market Measures: 
Beta 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
S.D. of Total Stock Return 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
1.1145 0.3793 
1.1097 0.4729 
7.8695 2.0752 
8.1551 2.3020 
Accounting Measures: 
Debt to Assets Ratio 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
S.D. of Operating Income 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
Operating Leverage 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
554.79 
557.14 
281.19 
232.26 
0.2387 
0.0589 
142.70 
129.88 
514.64 
376.55 
0.5080 
0.9123 
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TABLE 3-6 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: Market and Accounting 
Risk Measures, 
1977-1981 Averages. 
Mean 
Market Measures: 
Beta 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
S.D. of Total Stock Return 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
Accounting Measures: 
Debt to Assets Ratio 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
S.D. of Operating Income 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
Operating Leverage 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
1.0810 
1.1402 
7.5722 
8.0136 
546.23 
549.49 
251.15 
213.67 
0.1289 
0.1797 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.3819 
0.4325 
2.1026 
2.2333 
134.32 
126.32 
474.80 
352.89 
0.0726 
0.4606 
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TABLE 3-7 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: Reputation Measures 
1977-1981 Averages. 
Mean 
Quality of Management 
Group 1: 6.6480 
Group 2: 6.5243 
Quality of Products 
Group 1: 7.0524 
Group 2: 6.8990 
Innovation 
Group 1: 6.2196 
Group 2: 6.1157 
Long Term Investment 
Group 1: 6.1241 
Group 2: 6.0547 
Financial Soundness 
Group 1: 6.5449 
Group 2: 6.5049 
Ability to Attract, Develop 
and Keep Talented People 
Group 1: 6.2992 
Group 2: 6.2035 
Corporate and Social 
Responsibility 
Group 1: 6.3220 
Group 2: 6.3041 
Use of Corporate Assets 
Group 1: 6.1971 
Group 2: 6.1204 
Average Quality 
Group 1: 6.4245 
Group 2: 6.3400 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.9016 
0.8687 
0.7151 
0.7235 
0.8540 
0.8081 
0.7886 
0.8986 
0.9859 
1.1686 
0.8503 
0.8541 
0.6935 
0.6897 
0.7313 
0.8016 
0.7259 
0.7734 
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TABLE 3-8 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: Reputation Measures 
1982 Averages. 
Mean 
Quality of Management 
Group 1: 6.5747 
Group 2: 6.5129 
Quality of Products 
Group 1: 7.0292 
Group 2: 6.8718 
Innovation 
Group 1: 6.1584 
Group 2: 6.1110 
Long Term Investment 
Group 1: 6.0047 
Group 2: 6.0194 
Financial Soundness 
Group 1: 6.3229 
Group 2: 6.3188 
Ability to Attract, Develop 
and Keep Talented People 
Group 1: 6.1467 
Group 2: 6.0900 
Corporate and Social 
Responsibi1ity 
Group 1: 6.0200 
Group 2: 6.2131 
Use of Corporate Assets 
Group 1: 6.0684 
Group 2: 6.0467 
Average Quality 
Group 1: 6.3135 
Group 2: 6.2731 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.1002 
0.9363 
0.8309 
0.8115 
0.9919 
0.9396 
0.9538 
0.8474 
1.2043 
1.2583 
0.9892 
0.8898 
0.7488 
0.7352 
0.9276 
0.8433 
0.8586 
0.8222 
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CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
As shown in Chapter II, the literature review, 
important questions exist concerning the relationships 
among various dimensions of corporate reputation and 
strategic performance. These questions are addressed 
through evaluating the stated hypotheses. The emphasis 
is on testing significance of possible relationships. 
Relationships among various risk and performance measures 
are also tested. 
Hypothesis One: Prior Objective Measures 
H2: Corporate reputation is significantly 
related to prior strategic performance. 
To evaluate H ], the significance of relationships 
between reputation and prior accounting and stock market 
performance is tested, as is the significance of 
relationships between prior performance and various other 
measures of risk and performance. Results for 
relationships among all performance measures are 
presented first. 
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ANQVA 
Prior ROA. Tables 4-1 through 4-3 contain results of 
ANOVA's with classification of firms into portfolios by 
prior accounting performance: z-score of average ROA for 
1977-1981. In Tables 4-1,4-2, and 4-3, measures of 
performance, risk, and reputation, respectively, are the 
independent variables. 
In Table 4-1, the only significant relationship is 
that between ROA averaged from 1977 to 1981, and 
subsequent ROA, averaged from 1982 to 1984. This was 
highly significant for both groups of firms. Firms with 
high ROA in a period will likely be able to enjoy 
continued advantages in a subsequent period. 
The lack of significant relationships with other 
subsequent measures of performance is probably more 
important. One might expect performance on ROA to be 
related to total stock return, for example, as managers 
strive to achieve balance between current profitability 
and their responsibility to shareholders. The lack of 
significance in this and other possible relationships 
represents lack of support for alternative hypotheses. 
It also suggests that the different performance measures 
convey independent information. 
Table 4-2 looks at relationships between prior ROA 
and accounting and market measures of risk. Only the 
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debt to assets ratio bears a significant relationship for 
both groups of firms, but it is highly significant for 
both. Obviously, ROA and debt to assets have common 
denominators, and assets would be relatively stable 
across periods. A high return could be used to reduce 
debt, financing assets with retained earnings or by 
attracting new equity. Thus an inverse relationship 
between ROA and subsequent debt to assets is likely. 
Table 4-3 contains results of ANOVA's with subsequent 
reputation measures, averaged from 1982 to 1984, as 
dependent variables. The results, especially compared to 
Tables 4-1 and 4-2, support the first hypothesis. 
Overall, nine relationships are significant, six are 
nearly so, and only three are not significant. Financial 
soundness and ability to attract, develop, and keep 
talented people are significant for both groups of firms. 
Quality of management, however, was significant only for 
group 1 firms. This is a mixed result for hypothesis 
H]a: quality of management was not significantly related 
to ROA for group 2. 
In Table 4-4 are results of ANOVA's with subsequent 
reputation measures, for 1982 only, as dependent 
variables and ROA as the independent variable. Limited 
to a more proximate time period, more results become 
significant: corporate and social responsibility and 
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average quality are now also significantly related to ROA 
for both groups. 
So, experts' subjective evaluations of performance 
are significantly related to prior ROA while objective 
measures except the debt to assets ratio and ROA itself 
are not. This is an important result, supporting the 
first hypothesis. 
Prior Total Stock Return. Tables 4-5, 4-6, 4-7, and 
4-8 contain results of ANOVA's with classification of 
firms by prior market performance: z-score of average 
total stock return for 1977-1981. 
In Tables 4-5 and 4-6, none of the performance or 
risk measures is significantly related for both groups, 
and only standard deviation of total stock return is 
significant for one group. 
In Tables 4-7 and 4-8 reputation is considered as a 
subsequent measure. The results are rather strange, 
frequently significant for group 1 and not for group 2. 
From the group 1 results, it would have been easy to 
infer experts' lagged perception of corporate attributes 
from prior stock performance. Instead one is lead to 
conclude that the matched groups are different in this 
respect. Recalling that the groups were matched for 
equal representation of industries, and within each 
industry, by average quality of management, it is 
92 
difficult to imagine random allocation of 98 firms would 
result in such a consistent difference, but it has. 
The results, therefore, cannot be said to clearly support 
or fail to support the hypothesis. Group 1 results 
appear to support it, and group 2 results do not. The 
specific hypothesis Hi& was not supported, in that long 
term investment was significantly related only for group 
1 firms. 
Simple Regression 
Prior Total Stock Return. Table 4-9 evaluates the 
significance of selected measures of risk and quality of 
management, in simple regressions, to explain the 
variation in prior total stock return. Only average 
beta, the measure of systematic risk, is significantly 
related, and then only for group 1. 
Prior R0A. Table 4-10 looks at the relationships 
between the selected measures and prior ROA. Only 
residuals is significant for both groups of firms. 
Residual error measures the firm's unsystematic risk. 
The correlation coefficient, simple r, is negative. 
Apparently, risky firms were the ones with higher ROA in 
the prior period. Average quality of management is 
significant for group 1, and average beta is significant 
for group 2. These results fail to support the first 
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hypothesis, and instead support an alternate hypothesis, 
that only residuals is strongly related to prior 
strategic performance. 
Prior Quality of Management. In Table 4-11, quality 
of management for 1982 is the dependent variable, and 
only averaged quality of management 1982-1984 is 
significant, but this is nearly an identity. It is 
notable that the other independent variables are not 
significant. 
Stepwise Regression 
Prior Total Stock Return. In Table 4-12, prior total 
stock return is again considered as the dependent 
variable, but with the selected subsequent measures as 
independent variables in a stepwise regression. It can 
be seen that, for group 1, both beta and residuals are 
significant, meaning the contribution of each to 
explained variation in the dependent variable was 
sufficient, so that it is unlikely that the sample came 
from a population in which its regression coefficient was 
zero. For group 1, residuals adds substantially to beta 
in explaining the variation in prior stock return. This 
follows from the definition of the market model. 
However, for group two, the average standard deviation of 
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income was entered first, and neither beta nor residuals 
is a significant predictor. 
The group 2 result may not be so different from group 
1 as it first appears. It is possible that standard 
deviation of income measures a similar risk effect as the 
combination of beta and residuals. When standard 
deviation of income enters first, it may remove much of 
the variation that beta and residuals would have 
explained. This could be tested in the future by forcing 
the prior inclusion of beta and residuals for group 2. 
For the first group, the overall regression is 
significant, and explains nearly 20% of the variation in 
total stock return. For the second group, the overall 
regression is not significant. 
Prior RQA. In Table 4-13, prior ROA is the dependent 
variable in a stepwise regression. As before in table 10, 
results are different for the two groups, and 
inconclusive. For group 1, residuals is the best 
explanatory variable, with quality of management adding 
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substantially to reach an unadjusted R of .319 in the 
second step. The group 2 results are quite different, 
with beta the first and only independent variable 
significantly related to ROA. The results obtained are 
not consistent enough to permit one to reject the null 
hypotheses, that there is no relationship of the 
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independent variables to prior ROA. However, both 
2 
overall regressions are significant, with adjusted R 's 
of .315 and .156. The full set of explanatory variables, 
quality of management and risk measures, together account 
for a significant amount of the variation in prior ROA. 
Stepwise Regression: Industrial and Non-Industrial Groups 
Tables 4-14 and 4-15 consider the same stepwise 
regressions, with the two groups of 49 firms further 
divided into subgroups of 39 industrial and 10 non¬ 
industrial firms. These tables also provide the overall 
results for the groups, as they were reported in Table 
4-9. The division of firms into industrial and non¬ 
industrial firms was undertaken to determine whether 
there were industry specific differences with respect to 
Hi, H^. and H^. H ^ is considered next and H ^ and H ^ are 
considered in later sections. 
Prior Total Stock Return. Prior total stock return 
is the dependent variable in the regression results 
presented in Table 4-14, with subsequent measures as 
independent variables. None of the independent variables 
is consistently significant across groups of firms. The 
overall regressions are significant for both groups of 
industrial firms, however. 
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Prior R0A. In Table 4-15, prior ROA is the dependent 
variable, with the selected risk measures and quality of 
management as explanatory variables. Here, results were 
significant for residuals, quality of management, and 
beta, but only for group 1 industrial firms, and for 
group 2 industrial firms only for beta. The overall 
regressions were significant only because of the 
significance of relationships among variables for 
industrial firms. 
Stepwise results by industrial group do not 
consistently support the first hypothesis, since the 
reputation measure, quality of management, is not 
significant across both groups of firms in explaining 
prior performance. 
Stepwise Regression With Marginal Quality of Management 
In Tables 4-16 to 4-18 are presented the results of 
stepwise regressions as in Tables 4-12 and 4-13, but with 
a new variable, marginal quality of management from 
equation (5), page 69, substituted for quality of 
management. 
P r i o r ROA. Marginal quality of management does not 
emerge as a significant predictor of ROA in the stepwise 
regression presented in Table 4-16. However, the overall 
regression is significant for both groups, with adjusted 
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R2 of .229 for the first group and .143 for group 2. The 
set of risk measures and marginal quality of management 
together account for a significant portion of the 
variation in prior ROA. The simple correlations are all 
negative, except for standard deviation of income for 
group 2. A likely explanation is that a high ROA in one 
period may somewhat reduce risk in a subsequent period: 
there are additional assets available for eventualities. 
Prior Total Stock Return. In Table 4-17, prior total 
stock return is the dependent variable. None of the 
explanatory varibles are significant for both groups of 
firms. The simple R between marginal quality of 
management and total stock return is negative, suggesting 
that a perceived improvement in quality of management may 
be associated with low prior total stock return. 
The result is that the new variable, marginal quality 
of management, is also unable to support the first 
hypothesis as bearing a strong relationship to prior 
objective measures of performance. 
Prior Quality of Management. By contrast, there is a 
highly significant negative relationship between marginal 
quality of management and quality of management for 1982, 
as reported in Table 4-18. For both groups of firms, 
marginal quality of management was entered first, and the 
simple correlation is negative at more than .5. This may 
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be an important result. It means that firms perceived as 
having high quality of management in 1982 would be most 
likely to suffer declines in that perception, and firms 
with low perceived quality would be seen as improving 
over the following two year period. This apparent effect 
could be partly an artifact of the tendency for extreme 
cases to drift toward the mean in subsequent 
observations. It likely also involves actual dynamics of 
perception: a manager perceived as performing poorly in 
1982 may be subsequently credited with resulting high 
performance. We may be most willing to attribute high or 
low quality of management when we notice a change. The 
2 
overall regressions were significant, with R of .29 and 
.39 for the two groups. 
Hypothesis Two: Subsequent Objective Measures 
H ~: Corporate Reputation is significantly 
related to subsequent strategic performance. 
To evaluate H 2, the significance of relationships 
between reputation and subsequent accounting and stock 
market performance is tested, as is the significance of 
relationships between subsequent performance and various 
other measures of risk and performance. 
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ANOVA 
Subseaent ROA. In Tables 4-19 through 4-21 are 
presented results of ANOVA's with classification of firms 
into portfolios by subsequent accounting performance: z- 
score of average ROA for 1982-1984. In Tables 4-19, 4- 
20, and 21, prior measures of reputation, performance, 
and risk, respectively, are the independent variables. 
Table 4-19 contains results of ANOVA's with 
reputation measures from 1982 only. Since there were no 
previous surveys, this represents "prior" reputation in 
relation to ROA averaged from 1982 to 1984. Use of 
corporate assets and average quality are significant for 
both groups. "Use of corporate assets" could be taken as 
approximately synonymous with "ROA." Five other 
reputation variables were significant for only one or the 
other of the two groups usually group 2. 
In Table 4-20, the only significant relationship is 
that between subsequent ROA averaged from 1982 to 1984, 
and ROA averaged from 1977 to 1981. This was highly 
significant for both groups of firms. Again, apparently 
only ROA among performance measures is related to ROA in 
another time period. This is an indication of the 
reliability of ROA. It may also indicate that managers 
will use accounting discretion to maintain an image of 
steady performance, and that conditions influencing ROA 
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may be fairly stable. The remaining performance measures 
are not related to ROA. 
The lack of a relationship with average assets 
indicates the lack of a simple returns to scale effect. 
Larger firms in this time frame were not assured a 
subsequent higher return on their larger assets. 
Similarly, growth, whether in sales, assets, or operating 
income, did not ensure a subsequent higher ROA. One 
would expect the performance of a firm to be a 
continuation of its prior performance, but this is not 
supported here, except specifically with regard to ROA 
itself. 
Table 4-21 looks at relationships between subsequent 
ROA and accounting and market measures of risk. Only the 
debt to assets ratio bears a significant relationship, 
and then only for group 2. Again, the absence of other 
significant relationships is perhaps more important: 
firms grouped by ROA will not be significantly different 
with regard to either prior or subsequent measures of 
risk. 
The results tend to support hypothesis 2 with regard 
to subasequent ROA, albeit not strongly. 
Subsequent Total Stock Return. Tables 4-22 through 
4-24 contain results of ANOVA's with classification of 
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firms into portfolios by subsequent market performance: 
z-score of average total stock return, 1982-1984. 
Remarkably, none of the dependent variables are 
significantly related for both groups. ROA is 
significant only for group 1. The second hypothesis is 
not supported with respect to total stock return. 
Reputation is not related to subsequent market 
performance of the firm. This appears to be a strong 
rejection of the many possible relationships that might 
be hypothesized as predictions of total stock return: an 
important negative result. 
Simple Regression 
Subsequent Total Stock Return. The results of simple 
regressions evaluating H 2 are in Tables 4-25 to 4-27. In 
Table 4-25, none of the independent variables was a 
significant predictor of total stock return for both 
groups. Thus hypothesis H 2 a is not supported. 
Subsequent ROA. In Table 4-26 are results of simple 
regressions with ROA as the dependent variable. Prior 
quality of management and prior beta are significant 
predictors for both groups. This suggests qualified 
support for hypothesis H2b: Quality of management is a 
significant predictor of ROA. Though beta is 
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significant, quality of management has a slightly higher 
probability. 
Subsequent Quality of Management. Quality of 
management is the dependent variable in Table 4-27, and 
only prior quality of management is a significant 
predictor, which is to be expected, since one measure is 
embedded in the other. 
In sum, the simple regressions indicate that none of 
the independent variables is significantly related to 
either stock return or quality of management, except 
prior quality of management. About 10% of the variation 
in ROA was explained by either prior quality of 
management or by prior beta. Thus, the second hypothesis 
is supported by simple regressions, but only with respect 
to ROA. 
Stepwise Regression 
Subsequent Total Stock Return. Subsequent total 
stock return is the dependent variable presented in a 
stepwise regression in Table 4-28. For the first group, 
averaged residuals for the period 1977-1981 entered 
first, and was significant, meaning that it is unlikely 
2 
that the sample was drawn from a population in which R 
or, equivalently, beta, equals zero. In group 1, 
averaged stock beta for the same period entered second, 
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and was also significant. Interestingly, average beta 
has a negative relationship with subsequent stock return, 
once the effect of average residuals has been taken into 
account. The results for group 2 are quite different, 
however. None of them are significant, and the order of 
inclusion is different. The overall regression is 
significant for group one, explaining nearly 25% of the 
variation in the independent variable, but not at all 
significant for group two. 
Subsequent ROA. The second equation considered 
averaged ROA for 1982 to 1984 as the dependent variable, 
with the same prior measures as independent variables. 
The result, presented in Table 4-29 matches the 
4 
corresponding simple regression analysis in Table 4-26 in 
that prior quality of management is a significant 
predictor of ROA for both groups of firms. Compared to 
the simple regressions, in which beta is a significant 
independent variable for both groups of firms, it has 
become more significant for group 1 and insignificant for 
group 2. Both overall regressions are significant when 
all four independent variables are included, but explain 
only about 20% of the variation in ROA. This result adds 
support to the second hypothesis, and suggests that beta 
adds to quality of management as a predictor of 
subsequent ROA only for group 2. 
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Thus, specific hypothesis H2c is only slightly 
2 
supported: adjusted R for the stepwise regression 
combining quality of management and risk measures is .191 
for group 1, and .216 for group 2, compared to the 
2 
highest R of .143 for simple regressions using the same 
variables. 
Stepwise Regression: Industrial and Non-Industrial Groups 
Tables 4-30 and 4-31 consider the same stepwise 
regressions, with the two groups of 49 firms further 
divided into subgroups of 39 industrial and 10 non¬ 
industrial firms. These tables also provide the overall 
results for the groups, as they were reported in Table 
4-9, above. 
Subsequent Total Stock Return. Total stock return is 
the dependent variable in Table 4-30. The only 
independent variable found consistently significant is 
averaged prior residuals for both groups of industrial 
firms. Again, residual error measures the firm's 
unsystematic risk, and apparently, risky firms were the 
ones with higher subsequent stock returns. Between the 
two groups of non-industrial firms, the sign of the 
correlation coefficient, simple R, reverses, being 
positive for group 1 and negative for group 2. The 
overall regression is not significant for group 2 firms 
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because of the non-industrial firms among them: 
otherwise, the overall regressions are all significant. 
Subsequent RQA. Separating industrial and non¬ 
industrial firms with ROA as the dependent variable 
yields more specific results than were obtained in the 
correspond!* ng overall regression. Table 4-31 shows that 
prior quality of management and beta are significant 
predictors for both groups of industrial firms. Quality 
of management is not significant for either group of non¬ 
industrial firms, and beta is not significant for group 1 
non-industrial firms. None of the remaining independent 
variables were found significant. This suggests a 
possible increase in precision for the second hypothesis, 
specifying a relationship to ROA for industrial firms 
only. 
Hypothesis Three: Contemporaneous Objective Measures 
H3: Corporate reputation is significantly 
related to contemporaneous strategic 
performance. 
To evaluate H3, the significance of relationships 
between reputation and contemporaneous accounting and 
stock market performance is tested, as is the 
significance of relationships between contemporanous 
performance and various other measures of risk and 
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performance. Results for relationships among all 
performance measures are presented first. 
ANOVA 
Contemporaneous ROA. In Tables 4-32, 4-34, and 4-36, 
firms were grouped into ten "portfolios" by the Z-scores 
of their average ROA's for the period 1982 to 1984. 
Tables 4-33 and 4-35 were similarly based on ROA for the 
period 1977 to 1981. 
Table 4-32 contains the results of seven "ONEWAY" 
ANOVA's representing contemporaneous market and 
accounting performance measures. Total stock return was 
not found to be significantly related to ROA. Alpha was 
significant for both groups, however. This is not 
surprising in that ROA is based on net income, reported 
net income will influence stock price, and net income is 
used to pay dividends. So a company's own ROA could be 
expected to be related to its excess return. Thus, 
excess return reflects a firm's distinctive performance, 
while total stock return would dilute this distinctive 
effect by incorporating general market movements. A 
check on these relationships for another time period, 
1977 to 1981, is provided in Table 4-33. However, in 
this period, a significant relationship did not exist. 
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Also notable for their lack of significant 
relationships with ROA, in either time period, were 
average assets, sales growth, assets growth, and 
operating income growth. 
The significant relationship between ROA as an 
independent variable and ROA as a dependent variable is 
an artifact: they represent the same time period and the 
same data. This result is included to demonstrate the 
integrity of the analysis. Similar results are included 
for ROA in Table 4-32 and 4-33, and for total stock 
return in 4-37,and 4-40. 
Among contemporaneous risk measures presented in 
Table 4-34, only beta was significantly related to ROA 
for both groups of firms. Beta is a stock's systematic, 
non-diversifiable market risk. A significant 
relationship between beta and ROA could mean either that 
firms whose stocks move with the market are likely to be 
more profitable, or the opposite, that firms whose stocks 
have low betas and move oppositely to the market are more 
profitable. This effect would likely depend on the 
direction of movement of the market as a whole in a 
period, and was not observed for the period 1977 to 1981, 
as presented in Table 4-35. 
Again noteworthy are the variables that might have 
had significant relationships, but did not. For the 1982 
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to 1984 period, the relationship to standard deviation of 
total stock return, a measure of a stock's total risk, 
was highly significant for group 2: .000, but not 
significant for group 1: .126. This points out the fact 
that the two groups, though randomly selected, and 
matched by industries and by average quality of 
management, are not necessarily equivalent, and a 
relationship that is not significant for both groups is 
less likely to be observed among other groups of firms or 
other time periods. Similarly, among contemporaneous 
accounting risk measures, ROA and the debt to assets 
ratio were significantly related for group 2: .024, but 
not for group 1: .494. At least this is consistent with 
the previous distinction between the groups: many 
relationships were significant for group 1 firms and not 
for group 2. The remaining risk measures, standard 
deviation of operating income, and operating leverage, do 
not bear significant relationships to ROA. 
Looking at the period 1977 to 1981, in Table 4-35, 
the debt to assets ratio bears a highly significant 
relation to ROA for both groups. One obvious reason for 
the debt to assets ratio to be related to return on 
assets is that the two variables have a common 
denominator. This is true for the significant 
relationship found for group 1 in Table 34 as well as for 
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the same relationship found for both groups in Table 35. 
A further possibility is that greater leverage, a 
specific measure of risk, is associated with higher 
return on assets. In sum, neither market nor accounting 
measures of risk, with the possible exception of the debt 
to assets ratio, are reliably associated with ROA in the 
same period. 
The relationships between ROA and contemporaneous 
measures of reputation are presented in Table 36. In the 
1982 to 1984 period, fourteen of the possible 
relationships are significant, and the remaining four are 
nearly so. This remarkable result indicates that in 
considering three-year average contemporaneous measures, 
reputation is much more consistently related to ROA than 
are either market or accounting measures. Using three 
year averages does allow some influence of prior ROA on 
reputation and conversely. 
In conclusion, ROA is frequently related to various 
measures of reputation. Among the measures of 
reputation, only innovation consistently lacked a 
significant relationship. Alpha and beta were 
significantly related to ROA only within the 1982 to 1984 
time period. Debt to assets was significantly related as 
a subsequent measure, and as a contemporaneous measure in 
1977 to 1981 only. 
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It is notable that reputation is more frequently and 
more closely related to contemporaneous than to prior or 
subsequent ROA. 
Contemporaneous Total Stock Return. In Tables 4-37 
through 4-39, firms were grouped into ten "portfolios" by 
the z-scores of their average total stock returns for the 
period 1982 to 1984. Tables 4-40 and 4-41 were similarly 
based on total stock return for the period 1977 to 1981. 
Table 4-39 indicates a surprising lack of 
relationship between total stock return and 
contemporaneous measures of reputation. Hypothesis 3 is 
not supported. This important result is in contrast to 
the frequent significance of relationships between 
reputation and ROA reported above. Prior measures of 
reputation, reported in Table 4-24 also lack relationship 
to total stock return. Apparently, experts perceptions 
of a firm are more closely based on ROA than on stock 
return. 
Table 4-37 contains the results with contemporaneous 
market and accounting performance measures as independent 
variables. The F ratios for alpha are lower, but still 
highly significant, simply because alpha is a component 
of the classification variable. None of the accounting 
measures of performance are significantly related to 
total stock return for both groups of firms, a surprising 
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result. The same result was obtained for the time period 
1977 to 1981, as indicated in Table 4-40. It is 
interesting to note, in tables 37 and 40, that in the 
four instances in which the relationship is significant 
for one group but not for the other, it is group 1 which 
is significant. 
Contemporaneous risk measures are considered as 
independent variables for the two time periods in Tables 
4-38 and 4-41. Noteworthy is the lack of significant 
relationships, except for market risk measures in the 
1977 to 1981 time period. It may be that firms with high 
total stock returns tended to have either more or less 
risk associated with those returns in that period. 
Stepwise Regression with Marginal Quality of Management 
Contemporaneous Total Stock Return. In Table 4-42, 
the dependent variable is total stock return. 
Contemporaneous marginal quality of management is a 
significant explanatory variable for both groups of 
firms, accounting for more than 20% of the variation in 
total stock return. This is another important result. 
The correlation between marginal quality of management 
and total stock return is about .5 for both firms. The 
additional independent variables, prior measures of risk, 
are not significant for both groups. 
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Contemporaneous ROA. Marginal quality of management 
does not emerge as a significant predictor of ROA in the 
stepwise regression presented in Table 4-43. Only prior 
beta is significant, as was found in the simple 
regression of Table 4-26. 
Contemporaneous Average Quality of Management. 
Perhaps surprisingly, marginal quality of management did 
not emerge as significant in relation to average quality 
of management for the period 1982-1984, as reported in 
Table 4-44. 
It is remarkable that H3 is supported with respect to 
marginal quality of management and total stock return 
when other reputation measures are more related to ROA. 
A possible explanation of this is that a change in 
quality of management has a "figure-ground" effect on 
investors: they notice a change in progress and 
continuously revise their expectations. Furthermore, a 
change in management may have a delayed effect 
anticipated by investors, reflected in stock return 
immediately but not reflected immediately in ROA. 
Hypothesis Four: Correlation of Reputation Measures 
H4: The various dimensions of corporate 
reputation are highly correlated. 
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Correlation 
To evaluate hypothesis H4, correlations among the 
eight dimensions of management quality were examined. 
For this purpose, five years of Fortune data were 
analyzed, including 1982 through 1986. The results, 
presented in Table 4-45, indicate the high degree of 
interrelation among these dimensions. The eight 
variables had an average correlation of .75. Only one 
variable, social responsibility, had a significantly 
lower average correlation, .58. Apparently the 
attribution of social responsibility is less related to 
the other attributes. The highest correlation, .93, was 
found between quality of management and use of corporate 
assets. This suggests a strong halo effect: that experts 
are influenced by one or a few of the characteristics of 
an organization and infer similar performance on a 
variety of dimensions. 
Even though the various dimensions of reputation are 
highly correlated, there were different results when each 
is considered in relation to performance using ANOVA's. 
This is due to the sensitivity of ANOVA, as described 
above under ANOVA in Chapter III. 
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TABLE 4-1 
ANOVA: Prior ROA with Performance Measures. 
Independent Variable: Prior Accounting Performance, 
Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1977-1981 
Dependent Variables: Performance Measures, 
1982-1984 Averages 
Dependent Variables F Ratio F Prob. 
Market Measures: 
Alpha 
Group 1: 1.026 0.437 
Group 2: 
Total Stock Return 
1.138 0.361 
Group 1: 1.483 0.189 
Group 2: 1.272 0.283 
Accounting Measures: 
Return On Assets 
Group 1: 5.528 0.000 
Group 2: 
Average Assets 
5.189 0.000 
Group 1: 1.029 0.435 
Group 2: 
Sales Growth 
1.412 0.217 
Group 1: 1.165 0.344 
Group 2: 
Assets Growth: 
1.131 0.365 
Group 1: 1.602 0.149 
Group 2: 
Operating Income Growth: 
0.682 0.721 
Group 1: 1.251 0.294 
Group 2: 1.173 0.339 
** p < .01 * pf .05 
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TABLE 4-2 
ANOVA: Prior ROA with Risk Measures. 
Independent Variables: Prior Accounting Performance, 
Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1977-1981 
Dependent Variables: Risk Measures, 
1982-1984 Averages 
Dependent Variables F Ratio Prob. 
Market Measures: 
Beta 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
S.D. of Total Stock Return 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
0.481 0.879 
1.594 0.151 
1.015 0.445 
2.224 0.041 
Accounting Measures: 
Debt to Assets Ratio 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
S.D. of Operating Income 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
Operating Leverage 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
5.686 
4.324 
0.985 
1.018 
1.231 
0.946 
0.000 ** 
0.001 ** 
0.467 
0.443 
0.305 
0.498 
** p < .01 * Pi .05 
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TABLE 4-3 
ANOVA: Prior ROA with Reputation Measures. 
Independent Variable: Prior Accounting Performance, 
Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1977-1981 
Dependent Variables: Reputation Measures, 
1982-1984 Averages 
Dependent Variables F Ratio F Prob. 
Quality of Management 
Group 1: 3.078 0.007 ** 
Group 2: 0.836 0.588 
Quality of Products 
Group 1: 2.039 0.061 
Group 2: 2.306 0.035 * 
Innovation 
Group 1: 1.353 0.243 
Group 2: 1.714 0.119 
Long Term Investment 
Group 1: 3.101 0.007 ** 
Group 2: 1.085 0.394 
Financial Soundness 
Group 1: 2.702 0.015 * 
Group 2: 2.184 0.045 * 
Ability to Attract, Develop 
and Keep Talented People 
Group 1: 2.970 0.009 ** 
Group 2: 2.220 0.042 * 
Corporate and Social 
Responsibi1ity 
Group 1: 1.961 0.071 
Group 2: 4.637 0.000 ** 
Use of Corporate Assets 
Group 1: 3.259 0.005 ** 
Group 2: 1.537 0.169 
Average Quality 
Group 1: 3.062 0.007 ** 
Group 2: 1.933 0.075 
** p * .01 * p 5 .05 
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TABLE 4-4 
ANOVA: Prior ROA with Reputation Measures. 
Independent Variables: Prior Accounting Performance, 
Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1977-1981 
Dependent Variables: Reputation Measures, 
1982 
Dependent Variables F Ratio Prob. 
Quality of Management 
Group 1: 3.335 0.004 
Group 2: 0.901 0.533 
Quality of Products 
Group 1: 2.160 0.047 
Group 2: 1.683 0.126 
Innovation 
Group 1: 1.722 0.117 
Group 2: 1.524 0.174 
Long Term Investment 
Group 1: 3.031 0.008 
Group 2: 1.188 0.330 
Financial Soundness 
Group 1: 2.890 0.010 
Group 2: 3.355 0.004 
Ability to Attract, Develop 
and Keep Talented People 
Group 1: 3.459 0.003 
Group 2: 2.549 0.021 
Corporate and Social 
Responsibi1ity 
Group 1: 2.827 0.012 
Group 2: 4.446 0.001 
Use of Corporate Assets 
Group 1: 2.893 0.010 
Group 2: 1.561 0.161 
Average Quality 
Group 1: 3.544 0.003 
Group 2: 2.143 0.049 
** p 5 .01 * p ^ .05 
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TABLE 4-5 
ANOVA: Prior Total Stock Return with Performance Measures. 
Independent Variables: Prior Market Performance, 
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock Return, 
1977-1981 
Dependent Variables: Performance Measures, 
1982-1984 Averages 
Dependent Variables F Ratio F Prob. 
Market Measures: 
Alpha 
Group 1: 0.799 0.619 
Group 2: 0.627 0.766 
Total Stock Return 
Group 1: 0.923 0.516 
Group 2: 0.670 0.731 
Accounting Measures: 
Return On Assets 
Group 1: 1.068 0.407 
Group 2: 0.447 0.900 
Average Assets 
Group 1: 0.920 0.518 
Group 2: 0.664 0.736 
Sales Growth 
Group 1: 1.334 0.252 
Group 2: 0.883 0.549 
Assets Growth: 
Group 1: 1.299 0.269 
Group 2: 0.578 0.807 
Operating Income Growth: 
Group 1: 1.366 0.237 
Group 2: 0.542 0.834 
** p .01 * p 5 .05 
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TABLE 4-6 
ANOVA: Prior Total Stock Return with Risk Measures 
Independent Variable: Prior Market Performance, 
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock 
1977-1981 
Dependent Variables: Risk Measures, 
1982-1984 Averages 
Dependent Variables F Ratio 
Market Measures: 
Beta 
Group 1: 1.884 
Group 2: 0.189 
S.D. of Total Stock Return 
Group 1: 2.195 
Group 2: 0.404 
Accounting Measures: 
Debt to Assets Ratio 
Group 1: 1.079 
Group 2: 1.676 
S.D. of Operating Income 
Group 1: 1.533 
Group 2: 0.834 
Operating Leverage 
Group 1: 0.610 
Group 2: 0.843 
** p < .01 * pf .05 
Return, 
F Prob. 
0.084 
0.994 
0.044 * 
0.925 
0.399 
0.128 
0.171 
0.589 
0.781 
0.582 
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TABLE 4-7 
ANOVA: Prior Total Stock Return with Reputation Measures. 
Independent Variable: Prior Market Performance, 
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock Return, 
1977-1981 
Dependent Variables: Reputation Measures, 
1982-1984 Averages 
Dependent Variables F Ratio F Prob. 
Quality of Management 
Group 1: 1.895 0.082 
Group 2: 0.917 0.521 
Quality of Products 
Group 1: 2.764 0.013 
Group 2: 1.072 0.404 
Innovation 
Group 1: 1.651 0.135 
Group 2: 0.642 0.754 
Long Term Investment 
Group 1: 2.144 0.049 
Group 2: 0.950 0.495 
Financial Soundness 
Group 1: 1.666 0.131 
Group 2: 1.134 0.363 
Ability to Attract, Develop 
and Keep Talented People 
Group 1: 2.163 0.047 
Group 2: 1.176 0.337 
Corporate and Social 
Responsibi1ity 
Group 1: 1.206 0.319 
Group 2: 0.714 0.693 
Use of Corporate Assets 
Group 1: 1.918 0.078 
Group 2: 1.370 0.235 
Average Quality 
Group 1: 2.044 0.060 
Group 2: 1.065 0.410 
** p i .01 * pi .05 
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TABLE 4-8 
ANOVA: Prior Total Stock Return with Reputation. 
Independent Variable: Prior Market Performance, 
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock Return, 
1977-1981 
Dependent Variables: Reputation Measures, 
1982 
Dependent Variables F Ratio F Prob. 
Quality of Management 
Group 1: 3.777 0.002 
Group 2: 0.940 0.503 
Quality of Products 
Group 1: 3.518 0.003 
Group 2: 0.999 0.457 
Innovation 
Group 1: 2.534 0.021 
Group 2: 0.628 0.766 
Long Term Investment 
Group 1: 3.019 0.008 
Group 2: 0.980 0.471 
Financial Soundness 
Group 1: 2.955 0.009 
Group 2: 1.056 0.415 
Ability to Attract, Develop 
and Keep Talented People 
Group 1: 3.299 0.004 
Group 2: 1.036 0.430 
Corporate and Social 
Responsibi1ity 
Group 1: 1.501 0.182 
Group 2: 0.824 0.598 
Use of Corporate Assets 
Group 1: 3.391 0.004 
Group 2: 1.471 0.193 
Average Quality 
Group 1: 3.532 0.003 
Group 2: 1.028 0.436 
** p £ .01 * p £ .05 
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TABLE 4-9 
SIMPLE REGRESSION: Prior Total Stock Return 
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management. 
Dependent Variable: Prior Average Total Stock Return, 
1977-1981 
Independent Variables: Risk Measures and Quality of Management, 
1982-1984 
2 
riable F Signif. R Simple R 
Avg. Beta 
Group 1: 4.338 0.043 * 0.085 0.291 
Group 2: 0.529 0.471 0.011 0.105 
Avg. S.D. of Income 
Group 1: 3.123 0.084 0.062 -0.250 
Group 2: 4.028 0.051 0.079 -0.281 
Avg. Qual. of Mgt. 
Group 1: 2.238 0.141 0.045 0.213 
Group 2: 0.650 0.424 0.014 0.117 
Avg. Residuals 
Group 1: 0.637 0.429 0.013 -0.142 
Group 2: 0.037 0.847 0.001 -0.028 
** p £ .01 * pi .05 
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TABLE 4-10 
SIMPLE REGRESSION: Prior ROA 
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management. 
Dependent Variable: Prior Average Return on Assets, 
1977-1981 
Independent Variables: Risk Measures and Quality of Management, 
1982-1984 
2 
riable F Signif. R Simple R 
Avg. Residuals 
Group 1: 12.789 0.001 0.214 -0.462 
Group 2: 4.870 0.032 * 0.094 -0.306 
Avg. Qual. of Mgt. 
Group 1: 6.183 0.017 * 0.116 0.341 
Group 2: 2.420 0.127 0.049 0.221 
Avg. Beta 
Group 1: 0.165 0.686 0.004 -0.059 
Group 2: 8.726 0.005 ** 0.157 -0.396 
Avg. S.D. of Income 
Group 1: 0.426 0.517 0.009 -0.095 
Group 2: 0.168 0.683 0.004 0.060 
** p £ .01 * P £ .05 
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TABLE 4-11 
SIMPLE REGRESSION: Prior Quality of Management 
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management. 
Dependent Variable: Prior Average Quality of Management, 
1982 
Independent Variables: Risk Measures and Quality of Management, 
1982-1984 
2 
Variable F Signif. R Simple R 
Avg. Qual. of Mgt. 
Group 1: 168.802 0.000 ** 0.782 0.884 
Group 2: 144.321 0.000 ** 0.754 0.869 
Avg. Beta 
Group 1: 2.164 0.148 0.044 0.210 
Group 2: 1.698 0.199 0.035 -0.187 
Avg. S.D. of Income 
Group 1: 0.781 0.381 0.016 -0.128 
Group 2: 1.586 0.214 0.033 0.181 
Avg. Residuals 
Group 1: 0.335 0.565 0.007 -0.084 
Group 2: 1.360 0.249 0.028 -0.168 
** p * .01 * pf .05 
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TABLE 4-12 
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Prior Total Stock Return 
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management. 
Dependent Variable: Prior Average Total Stock Return, 
1977-1981 
Independent Variables: Risk Measures and Quality of Management 
1982-1984 
2 
Variable F Signif. Mult. R R Simple R 
Avg. Beta 
Group 1: 4.338 0.043 * 0.291 0.085 0.291 
Group 2: 0.854 0.360 0.373 0.139 0.105 
Avg. Residuals 
Group 1: 6.602 0.013 * 0.447 0.199 -0.116 
Group 2: F- level insufficient, not entered in equation. 
Avg. S.D. of Income 
Group 1: 2.089 0.155 0.485 0.235 -0.250 
Group 2: 4.028 0.051 0.281 0.079 -0.281 
Avg. Qual. of Mgt. 
Group 1: 1.583 0.215 0.511 0.261 0.213 
Group 2: 2.305 0.136 0.351 0.123 0.117 
2 
Adjusted R F Signif. 
Overall Regression 
Group 1: 0.194 3.895 0.000 
Group 2: 0.082 2.426 0.070 
** p .01 * p ± .05 
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TABLE 4-13 
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Prior ROA 
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management. 
Dependent Variable: Prior Average Return on Assets, 
1977-1981 
Independent Variables: Risk Measures and Quality of Management, 
1982-1984 
2 
Variable F Signif. Mult. R R Simple R 
Avg. Residuals 
Group 1: 12.789 0.001 ** 0.462 0.214 -0.462 
Group 2: 2.333 0.134 0.444 0.197 -0.306 
Avg. Qual. of Mgt. 
Group 1: 7.079 0.011 * 0.565 0.319 0.341 
Group 2: 0.634 0.430 0.457 0.208 0.221 
Avg. Beta 
Group 1: 2.771 0.103 0.599 0.358 -0.059 
Group 2: 8.726 0.005 ** 0.396 0.157 -0.396 
Avg. S.D. of Income 
Group 1: 0.616 0.437 0.606 0.367 -0.095 
Group 2: F- level or tolerance insuffient to enter 
2 
Adjusted R F Signif. 
Overall Regression 
Group 1: 0.315 6.381 0.000 
Group 2: 0.156 3.950 0.010 
** p ^ .01 * p< .05 
** 
** 
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TABLE 4-14 
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Prior Total Stock Return 
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management 
-With Separate Results For 
Industrial and Non-Industrial Firms. 
Dependent Variable: Prior Average Total Stock Return, 1977-1981 
Independent Variables: Risk Measures and Quality of Management, 
1982-1984 
2 
Variable F Sign if. Mult. R R Simple R 
Avg. Beta 
Group 1: 4.338 0.043 * 0.291 0.085 0.291 
Industrial 3.793 0.059 0.305 0.093 0.305 
Non-industrial 0.872 0.393 0.709 0.503 0.265 
Group 2: 0.854 0.360 0.373 0.139 0.105 
Industrial F- level ' insufficient, not entered in ( squation 
Non-industrial 0.179 0.690 0.614 0.377 0.251 
Avg. Residuals 
Group 1: 6.602 0.013 * 0.447 0.199 -0.116 
Industrial 7.773 0.008 ** 0.504 0.254 -0.175 
Non-industrial 0.306 0.600 0.645 0.416 0.236 
Group 2: F- •1 evel insufficient, not entered in < equation. 
Industrial 1.439 0.238 0.451 0.203 0.118 
Non-industrial 0.296 0.606 0.595 0.354 -0.186 
Avg. S.D. of Income 
Group 1: 2.089 0.155 0.485 0.235 -0.250 
Industrial 1.091 0.303 0.526 0.277 -0.259 
Non-industrial 0.745 0.417 0.622 0.386 -0.182 
Group 2: 4.028 0.051 0.281 0.079 -0.281 
Industrial 6.266 0.017 * 0.381 0.145 -0.381 
Non-industrial 0.345 0.575 0.568 0.323 0.220 
(continued next page) 
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TABLE 4-14: (continued). 
2 
Variable F Signif. Mult. R R Simple R 
Avg. Qual. of Mgt. 
Group 1: 1.583 0.215 0.511 0.261 0.213 
Industrial 0.580 0.452 0.537 0.289 0.174 
Non-industrial 3.781 0.088 0.567 0.321 0.567 
Group 2: 2.305 0.136 0.351 0.123 0.117 
Industrial 1.110 0.299 0.413 0.170 0.029 
Non-industrial 3.254 0.109 0.538 0.289 0.538 
Adjusted R 
2 
F Signif. 
Overall Regression 
Group 1: 0.194 3.895 0.000 
Industrial 0.205 3.450 0.010 
Non-industrial 0.105 1.264 0.390 
Group 2: 0.082 2.426 0.070 
Industrial 0.135 2.975 0.040 
Non-industrial 0.000 0.755 0.590 
** p £ .01 * pi .05 
129 
TABLE 4-15 
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Prior ROA 
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management 
-With Separate Results For 
Industrial and Non-Industrial Firms. 
Dependent Variable: Prior Average Return on Assets, 
1977-1981 
Independent Variables: Risk Measures and Quality of Management, 
1982-1984 
2 
Variable F Signif. Mult. R R Simple R 
Avg. Residuals 
Group 1: 12.789 0.001 ** 0.462 0.214 -0.462 
Industrial 17.931 0.000 ** 0.571 0.326 -0.571 
Non-industrial 0.155 0.706 0.580 0.337 -0.144 
Group 2: 2.333 0.134 0.444 0.197 -0.306 
Industrial F-level or tolerance insuffient to enter 
Non-industrial 2.793 0.133 0.509 0.259 -0.509 
Avg. Qual. of Mgt. 
Group 1: 7.079 0.011 * 0.565 0.319 0.341 
Industrial 9.250 0.004 ** 0.681 0.464 0.439 
Non-industrial 0.034 0.861 0.626 0.392 -0.090 
Group 2: 0.634 0.430 0.457 0.208 0.221 
Industrial 0.720 0.402 0.516 0.267 0.272 
Non-industrial 0.880 0.384 0.744 0.553 0.086 
Avg. Beta 
Group 1: 2.771 0.103 0.599 0.358 -0.059 
Industrial 7.720 0.009 ** 0.749 0.561 -0.009 
Non-industrial 0.499 0.506 0.623 0.388 -0.217 
Group 2: 8.726 0.005 ** 0.396 0.157 -0.396 
Industrial 12.468 0.001 ** 0.502 0.252 -0.502 
Non-industrial 0.012 0.916 0.744 0.554 -0.407 
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TABLE 4-15: (continued). 
2 
Variable F Signif. Mult. R R Simple R 
Avg. S.D. of Income 
Group 1: 0.616 0.437 0.606 0.367 -0.095 
Industrial F-level or tolerance insuffient to enter 
Non-industrial 3.798 0.087 0.567 0.322 -0.567 
Group 2: F-level or tolerance insuffient to enter 
Industrial F-level or tolerance insuffient to enter 
Non-industrial 3.120 0.121 0.698 0.487 -0.458 
2 
Adjusted R F Signif. 
Overall Regression 
Group 1: 0.315 6.381 0.000 ** 
Industrial 0.523 14.907 0.000 ** 
Non-industrial 0.000 0.805 0.570 
Group 2: 0.156 3.950 0.010 ** 
Industrial 0.226 6.547 0.004 ** 
Non-industrial 0.197 1.552 0.310 
** p 5 .01 * p 6 .05 
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TABLE 4-16 
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Prior ROA 
with Risk Measures 
and Marginal Quality of Management. 
Dependent Variable: Prior Average Return On Assets, 
1977-81 
Independent Variables: Risk Measures 
and Marginal Quality of Management, 
1982-1984 
2 
Variable F Signif. Mult. R R Simple R 
Avg. Residuals,1982- -84 
Group 1: 12.789 0.001 ** 0.462 0.214 -0.462 
Group 2: 
Avg. Beta,1982-84 
2.333 0.134 0.442 0.197 -0.306 
Group 1: 0.379 0.058 0.523 0.274 -0.059 
Group 2: 8.726 0.005 ** 0.396 0.157 -0.396 
Marginal Quality of Management 
Group 1: 1.167 0.286 0.541 0.292 -0.241 
Group 2: 0.764 0.387 0.459 0.211 -0.084 
AVG. S.D. of Income,1982-84 
Group 1: 0.055 0.815 0.541 0.293 -0.095 
Group 2: 0.205 0.653 0.463 0.214 0.060 
2 
Adjusted R F Signif. 
Overall Regression 
0.000 Group 1: 0.229 4.560 
Group 2: 0.143 3.001 0.020 
** p £ .01 * p < .05 
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TABLE 4-17 
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Prior Total Stock Return 
with Risk Measures 
and Marginal Quality of Management. 
Dependent Variable: Prior Average Total Stock Return 
1977-81 
Independent Variables: Risk Measures 
and Marginal Quality of Management 
1982-1984 
2 
Variable 
Marginal Quality 
F Signif. 
of Management 
Mult. R R Simple R 
Group 1: 4.427 0.041 * 0.293 0.086 -0.293 
Group 2: 0.502 0.482 0.298 0.089 -0.140 
Avg. Beta 
Group 1: 2.814 0.100 0.673 0.139 0.291 
Group 2: 0.654 0.423 0.319 0.102 0.105 
Avg. Residuals 
Group 1: 4.867 0.033 * 0.472 0.223 -0.116 
Group 2: 0.769 
AVG. S.D. of Income 
0.385 0.343 0.117 -0.028 
Group 1: 1.298 0.261 0.495 0.245 -0.250 
Group 2: 4.028 0.051 0.281 0.079 -0.281 
2 
Adjusted R F Signif. 
Overall Regression 
Group 1: 0.176 3.571 0.010 
Group 2: 0.037 1.463 0.230 
** p ^ .01 * p £ .05 
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TABLE 4-18 
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Prior Quality of Management 
with Risk Measures 
and Marginal Quality of Management. 
Dependent Variable: Prior Average Quality of Management 
1982 
Independent Variables: Risk Measures 
and Marginal Quality of Management 
1982-1984 
2 
Variable F Signif. Mult. R R Simple R 
Marginal Quality of Management 
Group 1: 22.333 0.000 ** 0.568 0.322 -0.568 
Group 2: 
Avg. Beta,1982-84 
15.767 0.000 ** 0.501 0.251 -0.501 
Group 1: 0.459 0.502 0.573 0.329 0.210 
Group 2: 0.017 0.898 0.662 0.438 -0.187 
Avg. Residuals,1982- -84 
Group 1: 0.916 0.344 0.585 0.342 -0.084 
Group 2: 8.785 0.005 ** 0.609 0.371 -0.168 
AVG. S.D. of Income,1982-84 
Group 1: 0.304 0.584 0.589 0.347 -0.128 
Group 2: 5.320 0.026 * 0.662 0.438 0.181 
2 
Adjusted R F Signif. 
Overall Regression 
Group 1: 0.287 5.838 0.000 
Group 2: 0.387 8.571 0.000 
** p 5 .01 * p 5 .05 
** 
** 
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TABLE 4-19 
ANOVA: Subsequent ROA with Reputation Measures. 
Independent Variable: Subsequent Accounting Performance, 
Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1982-1984 
Dependent Variables: Reputation Measures, 
1982 
Dependent Variables F Ratio F Prob. 
Quality of Management 
Group 1: 3.115 0.006 
Group 2: 1.383 0.229 
Quality of Products 
Group 1: 1.717 0.118 
Group 2: 2.615 0.018 
Innovation 
Group 1: 1.441 0.205 
Group 2: 1.358 0.240 
Long Term Investment 
Group 1: 1.312 0.262 
Group 2: 2.067 0.057 
Financial Soundness 
Group 1: 1.293 0.272 
Group 2: 4.069 0.001 
Ability to Attract, Develop 
and Keep Talented People 
Group 1: 2.070 0.057 
Group 2: 2.483 0.024 
Corporate and Social 
Responsibi1ity 
Group 1: 1.270 0.284 
Group 2: 2.855 0.011 
Use of Corporate Assets 
Group 1: 2.257 0.038 
Group 2: 2.191 0.044 
Average Quality 
0.050 Group 1: 2.132 
Group 2: 2.736 0.014 
** p 5 .01 * p i .05 
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TABLE 4-20 
ANOVA: Subsequent ROA with Performance Measures. 
Independent Variable: Subsequent Accounting Performance, 
Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1982-1984 
Dependent Variables: Performance Measures, 
1977-1981 Averages 
Dependent Variables F Ratio F Prob. 
Market Measures: 
Alpha 
Group 1: 0.504 0.863 
Group 2: 0.678 0.723 
Total Stock Return 
Group 1: 0.424 0.914 
Group 2: 0.750 0.662 
Accounting Measures: 
Return On Assets 
Group 1: 3.973 0.001 
Group 2: 5.883 0.000 
Average Assets 
Group 1: 1.199 0.323 
Group 2: 0.943 0.500 
Sales Growth 
Group 1: 0.677 0.724 
Group 2: 1.682 0.127 
Assets Growth: 
Group 1: 0.887 0.545 
Group 2: 0.667 0.773 
Operating Income Growth: 
Group 1: 0.114 0.999 
Group 2: 1.158 0.348 
** p £ .01 * pf .05 
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TABLE 4-21 
ANOVA: Subsequent ROA with Risk Measures. 
Independent Variable: Subsequent Accounting Performance, 
*Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1982-1984 
Dependent Variables: Risk Measures, 
1977-1981 Averages 
Dependent Variables F Ratio F Prob. 
Market Measures: 
Beta 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
S.D. of Total Stock Return 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
0.801 0.617 
2.074 0.056 
1.049 0.420 
1.572 0.158 
Accounting Measures: 
Debt to Assets Ratio 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
S.D. of Operating Income 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
Operating Leverage 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
0.778 
2.505 
1.878 
0.679 
0.688 
1.632 
0.637 
0.023 * 
0.085 
0.723 
0.715 
0.140 
** p ^ .01 * pi .05 
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TABLE 4-22 
ANOVA: Subsequent Total Stock Return with Performance Measures. 
Independent Variables: Subsequent Market Performance, 
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock Return, 
1982-1984 
Dependent Variables: Performance Measures, 
1977-1981 Averages 
Dependent Variables F Ratio F Prob. 
Market Measures: 
A1 pha 
Group 1: 0.973 0.477 
Group 2: 0.806 0.613 
Total Stock Return 
Group 1: 0.969 0.480 
Group 2: 0.609 0.782 
Accounting Measures: 
Return On Assets 
Group 1: 2.391 0.029 
Group 2: 0.886 0.546 
Average Assets 
Group 1: 0.762 0.651 
Group 2: 0.525 0.847 
Sales Growth 
Group 1: 0.655 0.743 
Group 2: 0.765 0.649 
Assets Growth: 
Group 1: 0.677 0.725 
Group 2: 1.555 0.163 
Operating Income Growth: 
Group 1: 0.405 0.925 
Group 2: 1.223 0.309 
** p 6: .01 * p £ .05 
138 
TABLE 4-23 
ANOVA: Subsequent Total Stock Return with Risk Measures. 
Independent Variables: Subsequent Market Performance, 
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock Return, 
1982-1984 
Dependent Variables: Risk Measures, 
1977-1981 Averages 
Dependent Variables F Ratio F Prob. 
Market Measures: 
Beta 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
S.D. of Total Stock Return 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
1.348 0.245 
0.329 0.960 
1.825 0.095 
0.479 0.880 
Accounting Measures: 
Debt to Assets Ratio 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
S.D. of Operating Income 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
Operating Leverage 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
1.726 0.116 
0.869 0.560 
0.734 0.676 
0.543 0.834 
0.448 0.900 
0.879 0.552 
** p < .01 * p < .05 
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TABLE 4-24 
ANOVA: Subsequent Total Stock Return with Reputation. 
Independent Variable: Subsequent Market Performance, 
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock Return, 
1982-1984 
Dependent Variables: Reputation Measures, 
1982 
Dependent Variables F Ratio F Prob. 
Quality of Management 
Group 1: 1.073 0.404 
Group 2: 0.438 0.906 
Quality of Products 
Group 1: 0.964 0.484 
Group 2: 0.304 0.969 
Innovation 
Group 1: 1.184 0.332 
Group 2: 0.538 0.838 
Long Term Investment 
Group 1: 1.256 0.291 
Group 2: 0.367 0.944 
Financial Soundness 
Group 1: 0.951 0.494 
Group 2: 0.464 0.890 
Ability to Attract, Develop 
and Keep Talented People 
Group 1: 0.936 0.505 
Group 2: 0.387 0.934 
Corporate and Social 
Responsibi1ity 
Group 1: 1.607 0.147 
Group 2: 1.637 0.139 
Use of Corporate Assets 
Group 1: 0.845 0.580 
Group 2: 0.346 0.953 
Average Quality 
0.407 Group 1: 1.068 
Group 2: 0.335 0.958 
** p £ .01 * pf .05 
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TABLE 4-25 
SIMPLE REGRESSION: Subsequent Total Stock Return 
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management. 
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Average Total Stock Return, 
1982-1984 
Independent Variables: Risk Measures, 1977-1981; 
and Quality of Management, 1982 
2 
riable F Signif. R Simple R 
Avg. Residuals 
Group 1: 6.288 0.016 * 0.118 0.344 
Group 2: 0.022 0.882 0.000 0.022 
Avg. S.D. of Income 
Group 1: 2.081 0.175 0.039 0.197 
Group 2: 1.896 0.175 0.039 0.197 
Avg. Qual. of Mgt. 
Group 1: 0.441 0.510 0.009 -0.096 
Group 2: 0.216 0.644 0.005 -0.068 
Avg. Beta 
Group 1: 0.380 0.541 0.008 -0.090 
Group 2: 0.672 0.416 0.014 -0.119 
** p < .01 * p 5 .05 
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TABLE 4-26 
SIMPLE REGRESSION: Subsequent ROA 
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management. 
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Average Return on Assets, 
1982-1984 
Independent Variables: Risk Measures, 1977-1981; 
and Quality of Management, 1982 
2 
riable F Signif. R Simple R 
Qual. of Mgt. 
Group 1: 5.969 0.018 * 0.113 0.336 
Group 2: 7.856 0.007 ** 0.143 0.378 
Avg. Beta 
Group 1: 5.631 0.022 * 0.107 -0.327 
Group 2: 4.636 0.036 * 0.090 -0.300 
S.D. of Income 
Group 1: 2.047 0.159 0.042 0.204 
Group 2: 1.893 0.175 0.039 0.197 
Avg. Residuals 
Group 1: 1.585 0.214 0.033 -0.181 
Group 2: 0.189 0.666 0.004 -0.063 
** p £ .01 * p i .05 
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TABLE 4-27 
SIMPLE REGRESSION: Subsequent Quality of Management 
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management. 
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Average Quality of Management, 
1982-1984 
Independent Variables: Risk Measures,1977-1981; 
and Quality of Management, 1982 
2 
Variable F Signif. R Simple R 
Avg. Qual. of Mgt. 
Group 1: 168.802 0.000 ** 0.782 0.884 
Group 2: 144.321 0.000 ** 0.754 0.869 
Avg. S.D. of Income 
Group 1: 1.291 0.262 0.027 0.164 
Group 2: 1.491 0.228 0.031 0.175 
Avg. Beta 
Group 1: 0.363 0.550 0.008 -0.088 
Group 2: 2.269 0.139 0.046 -0.215 
Avg. Residuals 
Group 1: 0.097 0.757 0.002 -0.045 
Group 2: 1.875 0.177 0.038 -0.196 
** p < .01 * p i .05 
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TABLE 4-28 
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Subsequent Total Stock Return 
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management. 
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Average Total Stock Return, 
1982-1984 
Independent Variables: Risk Measures, 1977-1981; 
and Quality of Management, 1982 
2 
Variable F Signif. Mult. R R Simple R 
Avg. Residuals 
Group 1: 6.288 0.016 * 0.344 0.118 0.344 
Group 2: 0.925 0.341 0.258 0.066 0.022 
Avg. Beta 
Group 1: 7.869 0.007 ** 0.497 0.247 -0.090 
Group 2: 0.405 0.528 0.217 0.047 0.119 
Avg. S.D. of Income 
Group 1: 2.177 0.147 0.531 0.282 0.206 
Group 2: 1.896 0.175 0.197 0.039 0.197 
Avg. Qual. of Mgt. 
Group 1: F- 1 evel insufficient, not entered in equation. 
Group 2: 0.310 0.580 0.270 0.073 0.068 
2 
Adjusted R F Signif. 
Overall Regression 
Group 1: 0.234 5.880 0.002 
Group 2: 0.000 0.865 0.490 
** p ^ .01 * p < .05 
144 
TABLE 4-29 
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Subsequent ROA 
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management. 
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Average Return on Assets, 
1982-1984 
Independent Variables: Risk Measures, 1977-1981; 
and Quality of Management, 1982 
2 
Variable F Signif. Mult. R R Simple R 
Avg. Qual. of Mgt. 
Group 1: 5.969 0.018 * 0.336 0.113 0.336 
Group 2: 7.856 0.007 ** 0.378 0.143 0.378 
Avg. Beta 
Group 1: 7.076 0.011 * 0.481 0.231 -0.327 
Group 2: 3.470 0.069 0.451 0.203 -0.300 
Avg. S.D. of Income 
Group 1: 1.292 0.262 0.502 0.252 0.204 
Group 2: 0.909 0.346 0.530 0.281 0.197 
Avg. Residuals 
Group 1: 0.342 0.562 0.508 0.258 -0.181 
Group 2: 3.859 0.056 0.516 0.266 -0.063 
2 
Adjusted R F Signif. 
Overall Regression 
Group 1: 0.191 3.829 0.000 
Group 2: 0.216 4.301 0.000 
** p < .01 * pi .05 
** 
** 
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TABLE 4-30 
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Subsequent Total Stock Return 
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management 
-With Separate Results For 
Industrial and Non-Industrial Firms. 
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Average Total Stock Return, 1982-1984 
Independent Variables: Risk Measures, 1977-1981; 
and Quality of Management, 1982 
2 
Variable F Signif. Mult. R R Simple R 
Avg. Residuals 
Group 1: 6.288 0.016 * 0.344 0.118 0.344 
Industrial 6.183 0.018 * 0.378 0.143 0.378 
Non-industrial 0.681 0.433 0.280 0.078 0.280 
Group 2: 0.925 0.341 0.258 0.066 0.022 
Industrial 4.587 0.039 * 0.332 0.110 0.332 
Non-industrial 7.195 0.028 * 0.688 0.474 -0.688 
Avg. Beta 
Group 1: 7.869 0.007 ** 0.497 0.247 -0.090 
Industrial 1.402 0.244 0.513 0.264 -0.004 
Non-industrial 10.839 0.013 * 0.799 0.638 -0.210 
Group 2: 0.405 0.528 0.217 0.047 0.119 
Industrial 3.561 0.067 0.436 0.190 0.063 
Non-industrial 0.450 0.524 0.711 0.505 -0.507 
Avg. S.D. of Income 
Group 1: 2.177 0.147 0.531 0.282 0.206 
Industrial 4.277 0.046 * 0.484 0.234 0.255 
Non-industrial 0.314 0.599 0.914 0.835 -0.138 
Group 2: 1.896 0.175 0.197 0.039 0.197 
Industrial 1.444 0.238 0.472 0.222 0.224 
Non-industrial 0.088 0.777 0.716 0.512 0.086 
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TABLE 4-30: (continued). 
2 
Variable F Signif. Mult. R R Simple R 
Avg. Qual. of Mgt. 
Group 1: F-level ' insufficient. not entered in i equation. 
Industrial 0.163 0.689 0.517 0. 267 -0.056 
Non-industrial 6.391 0.045 * 0.908 0. 825 -0.258 
Group 2: 0.310 0.580 0.270 0. 073 0.068 
Industrial 0.321 0.575 0.479 0. 230 -0.104 
Non-industrial 0.084 0.784 0.721 0. 521 0.089 
Adjusted 
2 
R F Signif. 
Overall Regression 
Group 1: 0.234 5.880 0.002 
Industrial 0.181 3.099 0.020 
Non-industrial 0.703 6.337 0.030 
Group 2: 0.000 0.865 0.490 
Industrial 0.139 2.535 0.050 
Non-industrial 0.137 1.357 0.360 
** p * .01 * p t .05 
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TABLE 4-31 
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Subsequent ROA 
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management 
-With Separate Results For 
Industrial and Non-Industrial Firms. 
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Average Return on Assets, 
1982-1984 
Independent Variables: Risk Measures, 1977-1981; 
and Quality of Management, 1982 
2 
Variable F Signif. Mult. R R Simple R 
Avg. Qual. of Mgt. 
Group 1: 5.969 0.018 * 0.336 0.113 0.336 
Industrial 5.917 0.020 * 0.371 0.138 0.371 
Non-industrial 3.592 0.107 0.825 0.681 0.122 
Group 2: 7.856 0.007 ** 0.378 0.143 0.378 
Industrial 10.647 0.002 ** 0.473 0.223 0.473 
Non-industrial 1.690 0.235 0.836 0.698 0.037 
Avg. Beta 
Group 1: 7.076 0.011 * 0.481 0.231 -0.327 
Industrial 5.924 0.020 * 0.510 0.260 -0.361 
Non-industrial 0.819 0.407 0.852 0.726 -0.415 
Group 2: 3.470 0.069 0.451 0.203 -0.300 
Industrial 5.615 0.024 * 0.616 0.379 -0.260 
Non-industrial 13.365 0.006 ** 0.791 0.626 -0.791 
Avg. S.D. of Income 
Group 1: 1.292 0.262 0.502 0.252 0.204 
Industrial 1.241 0.273 0.560 0.314 0.241 
Non-industrial 2.202 0.181 0.700 0.490 -0.384 
Group 2: 0.909 0.346 0.530 0.281 0.197 
Industrial 1.227 0.275 0.499 0.249 0.205 
Non-industrial 3.061 0.131 0.895 0.800 -0.493 
(continued next page) 
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TABLE 4-31: (continued). 
2 
Variable F Signif. Mult. R R Simple R 
Avg. Residuals 
Group 1: 0.342 0.562 0.508 0.258 -0.181 
Industrial 1.440 0.238 0.538 0.289 -0.122 
Non-industrial 3.926 0.083 0.574 0.329 -0.574 
Group 2: 3.859 0.056 0.516 0.266 -0.063 
Industrial 1.317 0.259 0.526 0.276 0.039 
Non-industrial 0.321 0.596 0.901 0.812 -0.528 
Adjusted 
2 
R F Signif. 
Overall Regression 
Group 1: 0.191 3.829 0.000 ** 
Industrial 0.233 3.890 0.010 ** 
Non-industrial 0.506 3.307 0.110 
Group 2: 0.216 4.301 0.000 ** 
Industrial 0.306 5.184 0.002 ** 
Non-industrial 0.662 5.410 0.040 * 
** p 6 .01 * P £ .05 
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TABLE 4-32 
ANOVA: Contemporaneous ROA with Performance Measures. 
Independent Variable: Contemporaneous Accounting Performance, 
Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1982-1984 
Dependent Variables: Performance Measures, 
1982-1984 Averages 
Dependent Variables F Ratio F Prob. 
Market Measures: 
A1 pha 
Group 1: 0.920 0.046 
Group 2: 2.235 0.040 
Total Stock Return 
Group 1: 0.605 0.785 
Group 2: 1.836 0.092 
Accounting Measures: 
Return On Assets 
Group 1: 197.312 0.000 
Group 2: 79.014 0.000 
Average Assets 
Group 1: 1.038 0.428 
Group 2: 0.777 0.638 
Sales Growth 
Group 1: 0.839 0.585 
Group 2: 0.506 0.861 
Assets Growth: 
Group 1: 1.761 0.108 
Group 2: 0.293 0.973 
Operating Income Growth: 
Group 1: 0.887 0.546 
Group 2: 0.756 0.656 
** p ± .01 * p < .05 
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TABLE 4-33 
ANOVA: Contemporaneous ROA with Performance Measures. 
Independent Variable: Contemporaneous Accounting Performance, 
Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1977-1981 
Dependent Variables: Performance Measures, 
1977-1981 Averages 
Dependent Variables F Ratio F Prob. 
Market Measures: 
Alpha 
Group 1: 2.004 0.065 
Group 2: 
Total Stock Return 
0.352 0.951 
Group 1: 1.617 0.144 
Group 2: 0.412 0.921 
Accounting Measures: 
Return On Assets 
Group 1: 78.871 0.000 
Group 2: 
Average Assets 
239.057 0.000 
Group 1: 0.676 0.726 
Group 2: 
Sales Growth 
1.276 0.281 
Group 1: 0.695 0.709 
Group 2: 
Assets Growth: 
1.468 0.194 
Group 1: 0.814 0.607 
Group 2: 
Operating Income Growth: 
0.828 0.594 
Group 1: 0.655 0.743 
Group 2: 0.992 0.463 
** p < .01 * p ^ .05 
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TABLE 4-34 
ANOVA: Contemporaneous ROA with Risk Measures. 
Independent Variables: Contemporaneous Accounting Performance, 
Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1982-1984 
Dependent Variables: Risk Measures, 
1982-1984 Averages 
Dependent Variables F Ratio F Prob. 
Market Measures: 
Beta 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
S.D. of Total Stock Return 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
Accounting Measures: 
Debt to Assets Ratio 
Group 1: 0.951 0.494 
Group 2: 2.490 0.024 ** 
S.D. of Operating Income 
Group 1: 1.297 0.270 
Group 2: 0.769 0.645 
Operating Leverage 
Group 1: 1.000 0.456 
Group 2: 1.076 0.402 
2.167 0.046 * 
3.116 0.006 ** 
1.685 0.126 
4.531 0.000 ** 
** p £ .01 * p i .05 
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TABLE 4-35 
ANOVA: Contemporaneous ROA with Risk Measures. 
Independent Variables: Contemporaneous Accounting Performance, 
Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1977-1981 
Dependent Variables: Risk Measures, 
1977-1981 Averages 
Dependent Variables F Ratio F Prob. 
Market Measures: 
Beta 
Group 1: 0.464 0.890 
Group 2: 
S.D. of Total Stock Return 
1.543 0.168 
Group 1: 1.401 0.221 
Group 2: 1.679 0.127 
Accounting Measures: 
Debt to Assets Ratio 
Group 1: 3.699 0.002 
Group 2: 
S.D. of Operating Income 
5.726 0.000 
Group 1: 0.971 0.478 
Group 2: 
Operating Leverage 
1.418 0.214 
Group 1: 0.954 0.492 
Group 2: 1.735 0.114 
** 
** 
** p ^ .01 * p < .05 
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TABLE 4-36 
ANOVA: Contemporaneous ROA with Reputation Measures. 
Independent Variable: Contemporaneous Accounting Performance, 
Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1982-1984 
Dependent Variables: Reputation Measures, 
1982-1984 Averages 
Dependent Variables F Ratio F Prob. 
Quality of Management 
Group 1: 3.879 0.001 
Group 2: 2.080 0.056 
Quality of Products 
Group 1: 2.421 0.027 
Group 2: 3.598 0.002 
Innovation 
Group 1: 1.915 0.078 
Group 2: 1.943 0.074 
Long Term Investment 
Group 1: 2.631 0.018 
Group 2: 2.554 0.021 
Financial Soundness 
Group 1: 3.176 0.006 
Group 2: 4.046 0.001 
Ability to Attract, Develop 
and Keep Talented People 
Group 1: 2.907 0.010 
Group 2: 3.307 0.004 
Corporate and Social 
Responsibility 
Group 1: 1.768 0.106 
Group 2: 3.228 0.005 
Use of Corporate Assets 
Group 1: 3.991 0.001 
Group 2: 3.732 0.002 
Average Quality 
Group 1: 3.628 0.002 
Group 2: 3.739 0.002 
** 
* 
** 
* 
* 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** p <■ .01 * P£ .05 
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TABLE 4-37 
ANOVA: Contemporaneous Total Stock Return with Performance Measures. 
Independent Variables: Contemporaneous Market Performance, 
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock Return, 
1982-1984 
Dependent Variables: Performance Measures, 
1982-1984 Averages 
Dependent Variables F Ratio F Prob. 
Market Measures: 
Alpha 
Group 1: 16.565 0.000 ** 
Group 2: 14.023 0.000 ** 
Total Stock Return 
Group 1: 23.136 0.000 ** 
Group 2: 111.611 0.000 ** 
Accounting Measures: 
Return On Assets 
Group 1: 1.330 0.254 
Group 2: 1.163 0.345 
Average Assets 
Group 1: 0.920 0.519 
Group 2: 0.482 0.878 
Sales Growth 
Group 1: 3.252 0.005 ** 
Group 2: 1.361 0.239 
Assets Growth: 
Group 1: 2.366 0.031 * 
Group 2: 0.695 0.709 
Operating Income Growth: 
Group 1: 1.384 0.229 
Group 2: 1.155 0.350 
** p £. .01 * p< .05 
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TABLE 4-38 
ANOVA: Contemporaneous Total Stock Return with Risk Measures. 
Independent Variables: Contemporaneous Market Performance, 
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock Return, 
1982-1984 
Dependent Variables: Risk Measures, 
1982-1984 Averages 
Dependent Variables F Ratio F Prob. 
Market Measures: 
Beta 
Group 1: 0.977 0.474 
Group 2: 0.257 0.982 
S.D. of Total Stock Return 
Group 1: 1.170 0.340 
Group 2: 0.805 0.614 
Accounting Measures: 
Debt to Assets Ratio 
Group 1: 1.998 0.066 
Group 2: 0.178 0.995 
S.D. of Operating Income 
Group 1: 0.822 0.600 
Group 2: 0.789 0.628 
Operating Leverage 
Group 1: 0.780 0.636 
Group 2: 1.110 0.379 
Assets Growth: 
Group 1: 2.366 0.031 
Group 2: 0.695 0.709 
Operating Income Growth: 
Group 1: 1.384 0.229 
Group 2: 1.155 0.350 
** p < .01 * pi .05 
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TABLE 4-39 
ANOVA: Contemporaneous Total Stock Return with Reputation Measures. 
Independent Variable: Contemporaneous Market Performance, 
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock Return, 
1982-1984 
Dependent Variables: Reputation Measures, 
1982-1984 Averages 
Dependent Variables F Ratio F Prob. 
Quality of Management 
Group 1: 1.366 0.237 
Group 2: 0.652 0.746 
Quality of Products 
Group 1: 0.864 0.564 
Group 2: 0.174 0.996 
Innovation 
Group 1: 1.680 0.127 
Group 2: 0.466 0.888 
Long Term Investment 
Group 1: 1.240 0.300 
Group 2: 0.839 0.586 
Financial Soundness 
Group 1: 1.568 0.159 
Group 2: 0.656 0.743 
Ability to Attract, Develop 
and Keep Talented People 
Group 1: 1.124 0.370 
Group 2: 0.329 0.960 
Corporate and Social 
Responsibility 
Group 1: 1.559 0.162 
Group 2: 1.572 0.158 
Use of Corporate Assets 
Group 1: 1.306 0.265 
Group 2: 0.904 0.531 
Average Quality 
Group 1: 1.320 0.258 
Group 2: 0.431 0.910 
** p ^ .01 * p ^ .05 
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TABLE 4-40 
ANOVA: Contemporaneous Total Stock Return with Performance Measures. 
Independent Variables: Contemporaneous Market Performance, 
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock Return, 
1977-1981 
Dependent Variables: Performance Measures, 
1977-1981 Averages 
Dependent Variables F Ratio F Prob. 
Market Measures: 
Alpha 
Group 1: 22.453 0.000 ★ ★ 
Group 2: 56.400 0.000 ★ ★ 
Total Stock Return 
Group 1: 23.732 0.000 ★ ★ 
Group 2: 150.326 0.000 ** 
Accounting Measures: 
Return On Assets 
Group 1: 2.006 0.065 
Group 2: 1.213 0.315 
Average Assets 
Group 1: 1.266 0.286 
Group 2: 0.787 0.630 
Sales Growth 
Group 1: 3.015 0.008 
** 
Group 2: 1.788 0.102 
Assets Growth: 
Group 1: 2.148 0.048 
★ 
Group 2: 0.888 0.545 
Operating Income Growth: 
Group 1: 4.430 0.001 
Group 2: 2.690 0.016 
* 
** p < .01 * p i .05 
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TABLE 4-41 
ANOVA: Contemporaneous Total Stock Return with Risk Measures. 
Independent Variables: Contemporaneous Market Performance, 
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock Return, 
1977-1981 
Dependent Variables: Risk Measures, 
1977-1981 Averages 
Dependent Variables F Ratio F Prob. 
Market Measures: 
Beta 
Group 1: 2.388 0.029 * 
Group 2: 1.787 0.102 
S.D. of Total Stock Return 
Group 1: 2.183 0.045 * 
Group 2: 2.512 0.023 * 
Accounting Measures: 
Debt to Assets Ratio 
Group 1: 0.844 0.581 
Group 2: 0.979 0.472 
S.D. of Operating Income 
Group 1: 1.006 0.452 
Group 2: 0.757 0.655 
Operating Leverage 
Group 1: 1.016 0.444 
Group 2: 1.395 0.224 
Assets Growth: 
Group 1: 2.366 0.031 
Group 2: 0.695 0.709 
Operating Income Growth: 
Group 1: 1.384 0.229 
Group 2: 1.155 0.350 
** p £ .01 * p ^ .05 
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TABLE 4-42 
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Total Stock Return 
with Risk Measures 
and Marginal Quality of Management. 
Dependent Variable: Average Total Stock Return 
1982-1984 
Independent Variables: Risk Measures, 1977-1981; 
and Marginal Quality of Management 
1982-1984 
2 
Variable F Signif. Mult. R R Simple R 
Marginal Quality of Management 
Group 1: 14.491 0.000 ** 0.485 0.236 0.485 
Group 2: 13.200 0.001 ** 0.468 0.219 0.468 
Avg. Residuals 
Group 1: 4.859 0.033 * 0.556 0.309 0.344 
Group 2: 0.265 0.609 0.502 0.252 0.022 
Avg. Beta, 
Group 1: 2.850 0.098 0.591 0.350 -0.090 
Group 2: 0.220 0.641 0.498 0.248 -0.119 
S.D. of Income 
Group 1: 0.840 0.364 0.602 0.362 0.206 
Group 2: 1.500 0.227 0.494 0.244 0.197 
2 
Adjusted R F Signif. 
Overall Regression 
Group 1: 0.304 6.242 0.000 
Group 2: 0.184 3.708 0.010 
** p 5 .01 * p £ .05 
** 
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TABLE 4-43 
STEPWISE REGRESSION: ROA 
with Risk Measures 
and Marginal Quality of Management. 
Dependent Variable: Average Return On Assets, 
1982-1984 
Independent Variables: Risk Measures, 1977-1981; 
and Marginal Quality of Management, 
1982-1984 
2 
Variable F Signif. Mult. R R Simple R 
Avg. Beta 
Group 1: 5.631 0.022 * 0.327 0.107 -0.327 
Group 2: 4.636 0.036 * 0.300 0.090 -0.300 
Avg. S.D. of Income 
Group 1: 1.091 0.302 0.357 0.128 0.204 
Group 2: 1.304 0.260 ** 0.386 0.149 0.197 
Marginal Quality of 
Group 1: 
Management 
0.181 0.673 0.362 0.131 0.050 
Group 2: 0.011 0.918 0.387 0.149 0.052 
Avg. Residuals 
Group 1: 0.068 0.795 0.364 0.133 -0.181 
Group 2: 1.827 0.183 0.353 0.125 -0.063 
2 
Adjusted R F Signif. 
Overall Regression 
Group 1: 0.054 1.680 0.170 
Group 2: 0.073 1.932 0.120 
** p ^ .01 * pi .05 
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TABLE 4-44 
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Quality of Management 
with Risk Measures 
and Marginal Quality of Management. 
Dependent Variable: Average Quality of Management 
1982-1984 
Independent Variables: Risk Measures, 1977-1981 
and Marginal Quality of Management 
1982-1984 
2 
Variable F Signif. Mult. R R Simple R 
Avg. S.D. of Income 
Group 1: 1.291 0.262 0.164 0.027 0.164 
Group 2: 1.055 0.310 0.260 0.067 0.175 
Marginal Quality of 
Group 1: 
Management 
1.853 0.180 0.254 0.064 -0.143 
Group 2: 0.234 0.631 0.269 0.072 -0.041 
Avg. Beta 
Group 1: 0.428 0.516 0.271 0.073 -0.088 
Group 2: 2.269 0.139 0.215 0.046 -0.215 
Avg. Residuals 
Group 1: 0.385 0.538 0.285 0.081 -0.045 
Group 2: 0.162 0.690 0.275 0.076 -0.196 
2 
Adjusted R F Signif. 
Overall Regression 
Group 1: 0.000 0.973 0.430 
Group 2: 0.000 0.900 0.470 
** p £ .01 * p ^ .05 
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TABLE 4-45 
CORRELATION: Reputation Measures, 1982-1986. 
Avg. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Corr. 
1.Quality of 
management 
1.0 .775 .808 .882 .727 .891 .498 .927 .787 
2. Quality of 
product 
.775 1.0 .765 .762 .652 .840 .674 .722 .741 
3. Innovation .808 .765 1.0 .732 .579 .835 .485 .763 .775 
4. Long-term 
investment 
value 
.882 .762 .732 1.0 .874 .914 .566 .897 .804 
5. Financial 
Soundness 
.727 .652 .579 .874 1.0 .838 .631 .821 .732 
6. Ability to 
attract 
people 
.891 .840 .835 .914 .838 1.0 .657 .872 .835 
7. Social 
Responsi¬ 
bility 
.498 .674 .485 .566 .631 .657 1.0 .522 .576 
8. Use of Corp. .927 .722 .763 .897 .821 .872 .522 1.0 .789 
Assets 
Overall -754 
Average 
Correlation 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Summary 
In the previous chapter, and Tables 1 through 45, 
detailed results were presented for each hypothesis. In 
Table 5-1, these results are summarized according to 
whether they support each hypothesis, fail to support it, 
or are mixed. All of the hypotheses, both general and 
specific, are presented in Exhibit 2-1. The hypotheses 
are summarized diagrammatical 1y in Figure 2-1. 
Hi: Corporate reputation is significantly 
related to prior strategic performance. 
The general hypothesis Hi was supported by ANOVA's 
which showed that dimensions of reputation were often 
significantly related to prior ROA (see Tables 4-3 and 4- 
4) . 
The results of ANOVA's testing H i with respect to 
total stock return were mixed: relationships to 
reputation were frequently significant for group 1 but 
never for group 2 (Tables 4-5 to 4-8). Simple and 
stepwise regressions failed to support H i with respect to 
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total stock return: the beta coefficients relating 
quality of management to prior total stock return were 
not significant. 
Industry differences might have led to different 
results for industrial and non-industrial groups with 
respect to H\. Stepwise regressions with the firms 
separated into industrial and non-industrial groups did 
not support for either group (Tables 4-14 and 4-15). 
Neither did stepwise regressions with marginal quality of 
management (Tables 4-16 to 18). A significant 
relationship was found between marginal quality of 
management and quality of management, 1982, however. 
Hia: Experts' perceptions of quality of 
management are significantly related to prior 
ROA. 
In relation to the specific hypothesis Hia, ANOVA, 
and simple and stepwise regressions provided mixed 
results: the beta coefficients relating quality of 
management to prior ROA were significant for group 1, but 
not for group 2 (Tables 4-3, 4-4, 4-10, 4-13). 
Hib: Experts' perceptions of long-term 
investment value are significantly related to 
prior total stock return. 
Results were mixed for specific hypothesis Hib: 
ANOVA's found a significant relationship between 
perception of long-term investment value and total stock 
return only for group 1 (Tables 4-7 and 4-8). 
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H2: Corporate Reputation is significantly 
related to subsequent strategic 
performance. 
Hypothesis H2 was supported by ANOVA's on ROA (Tables 
19 to 4-21), but not as often as was H\. Several 
reputation variables were significant in relation to 
subsequent ROA, and use of corporate assets and quality 
of management were significant for both groups of firms. 
As with prior ROA, ROA among performance measures, and 
debt to assets among risk measures were significantly 
related to subsequent ROA, but debt to assets only for 
group 2. 
ANOVA's yielded mixed results in terms of the second 
hypothesis with respect to total stock return: while 
neither performance nor return measures were significant, 
eight of nine reputation measures were significant, but 
only for group 1 (Tables 4-22 to 24). The marked 
difference between groups in this regard is intriguing. 
Simple regressions supported H2 with regard to ROA: 
only beta and quality of management were significant for 
both groups (Table 4-26). Simple regressions on total 
stock return yielded no significant predictors, however, 
failing to support H2 (Table 4-25). 
Separate stepwise results for industrial and non¬ 
industrial firms showed that the significance of beta and 
quality of management in relation to ROA were 
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specifically for industrial firms (Table 4-31). H^ was 
not supported with respect to subsequent total stock 
return: only residuals was significant, and only for both 
groups in the case of industrial firms (Table 4-30). 
Hpa: Experts' perceptions of long term 
investment value are significantly related to 
subsequent total stock return. 
Results of ANOVA failed to support H2 : perception of 
a 
long term investment value was not significantly related 
to total stock return (Table 4-24). 
H~, : Experts' perceptions of quality of 
management are a significant predictor of 
subsequent ROA while prior risk measures 
separately are not. 
Results of simple regression support H^. except that 
average beta, the measure of systematic risk, was also a 
significant predictor of subsequent ROA (Table 4-26). 
H2G: A combination of selected dimensions of 
prior reputation and risk explains more of the 
variation in subsequent ROA than does prior 
reputation or risk separately. 
A comparison of simple and stepwise regressions 
provides support for (Table 4-26, Table 4-29). It 
indicates that beta, the measure of systematic risk, is 
relatively independent of quality of management as a 
predictor, remaining significant for group 1 and nearly 
so for group 2, and adding substantially to explanatory 
2 
power: from R =.113 and .143 for quality of management in 
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simple regressions, to R =.231 and .203, for stepwise 
regressions adding beta to quality of management. 
Furthermore, the relationship between beta and ROA was 
found to be negative: greater risk meant lower return. 
Comparable results with total stock return as the 
dependent variable were mixed (Table 4-28). 
Hypothesis was strongly supported by ANOVA with 
ROA as the independent variable (Tables 4-3, 4-4, 4-21, 
and 4-36). Reputation measures were much more often 
significantly related to contemporaneous ROA than to 
prior or subsequent ROA. ANOVA based on total stock 
return failed to support the third hypothesis: none of 
the contemporaneous reputation measures were 
significantly related (Table 4-39). 
In stepwise regression marginal quality of management 
was found to be a highly significant explanatory variable 
in relation to total stock return, and not in relation to 
ROA, or even quality of management (Tables 4-42 to 44). 
It is remarkable that marginal quality of management was 
related to total stock return, when reputation measures 
were otherwise related only to ROA. 
The remaining hypothesis, H^, that the dimensions of 
reputation would be highly correlated, was confirmed for 
all of the dimensions, with an average correlation 
coefficient of .75 (Table 4-45). It was noted that the 
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average correlation for social responsibility was lower, 
at .58. 
In sum, with a range of methods, significant 
relationships were found between reputation and 
performance, but generally for ROA and not for total 
stock return. The relationships were strongest when the 
performance and reputation measures were contemporaneous 
three-year averages. Correlation analysis showed that 
the eight dimensions of reputation were themselves highly 
interrelated. 
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TABLE 5-1 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS BY HYPOTHESIS 
Hi: Corporate reputation is significantly related to 
prior strategic performance. 
Not 
Supported Supported Mixed 
ANOVA: ROA ANOVA: Total 
Stock Return 
Simple and 
Stepwise 
Regression: ROA 
H]a: Experts' perceptions of quality of management are 
significantly related to prior ROA. 
Not 
Supported Supported Mixed 
ANOVA, Simple, 
and Stepwise: ROA 
Hxb: Experts' perceptions of long-term investment value 
are significantly related to prior total stock return. 
Supported 
Not 
Supported Mixed 
ANOVA: Total 
Stock Return 
(continued next page) 
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TABLE 5-1 (continued). 
H2: Corporate Reputation is significantly related to 
subsequent strategic performance. 
Supported 
ANOVA and Simple 
Regression: ROA 
Stepwise 
Regression: ROA 
for Industrial 
Firms 
Not 
Supported 
Simple and 
Stepwise 
Regression: Total 
Stock Return 
Stepwise 
Regression: ROA 
for Non-Industrial 
Fi rms 
Mi xed 
H2a: Experts' perceptions of long term investment value 
are a significant predictor of subsequent total stock 
retu rn. 
Not 
Supported Supported Mixed 
ANOVA: Total Stock 
Return 
H2b: Experts' perceptions of quality of management are a 
significant predictor of subsequent ROA while prior risk 
measures and quality of management separately are not. 
Not 
Supported Supported Mixed 
Simple Regression: 
ROA 
(continued next page) 
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TABLE 5-1 (continued) 
H2c* A combination of selected dimensions of prior 
reputation and risk explains more of the variation in 
subsequent ROA than does prior reputation or risk 
separately. 
Not 
Supported Supported Mixed 
Simple and 
Stepwise 
Regressions: ROA 
H3: Corporate reputation is more often significantly 
related to contemporaneous strategic performance than to 
prior or subsequent strategic performance. 
Not 
Supported Supported Mixed 
ANOVA: ROA ANOVA: Total Stock 
Return 
ANOVA: Total Stock 
Return -Marginal 
Quality of 
Management 
H4: The various dimensions of corporate reputation are 
highly correlated. 
Not 
Supported Supported Mixed 
Correlation: 
Reputation 
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Conclusions 
The results of this study show that specific expert 
perceptions are related to certain measures of strategic 
performance, especially ROA. Table 5-2 contains selected 
references to literature that relate to these results. 
Accounting 
Accounting measures, and especially return on 
investment, have been often criticized (Fisher & McGowan, 
1983; Solomon, 1971; Harcourt, 1965). Curtis (1985) 
suggests that the accounting system fails to recognize 
non-financial transactions, such as the failure to 
preserve assets. Yet, ROA was found to be significantly 
related to use of corporate assets, in Tables 4-19 and 4 - 
36. In Table 4-36, ROA was found to be significantly 
related to most of the other dimensions of reputation. 
It appears that ROA does correspond to the perceptions of 
experts in a variety of dimensions. Other accounting and 
market measures of performance and risk generally are not 
significantly related. This lends some support to the 
value of ROA as a summary measure of strategic 
performance. 
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Attribution 
Attribution theory suggests that reputation, 
especially for quality of management, is related to prior 
performance. 
Butterfield and Powell (1981) found that performance 
descriptions explained nearly half of the variance in 
attributions of leadership style. Tables 4-3 and 4-4 
report several significant relations between reputation 
and prior ROA. Quality of management specifically was 
significant only for group 1, but abililty to attract, 
develop, and keep talented people was significant for 
both groups. This suggests a selectivity in attribution 
by experts. 
A significant negative relationship between perceived 
quality of management for 1982 and change in perceived 
quality of management from 1982 to 1984, Table 4-18, may 
be due to operation of the covariance principle (Kelley, 
1967). The covariance principle states that we attribute 
the cause of an action to the one factor with which it 
most strongly covaries. We may be most willing to 
attribute high or low quality of management when that 
represents a change. 
Prior ROA was more often significantly related to 
reputation than was total stock return. ROA likely 
represents distinctiveness information (Kelley, 1971), in 
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that it is a prominent, widely reported measure. Experts 
may observe more covariance (Kelley, 1967) with ROA than 
with stock return, which is more random. 
Business 
The significant relations observed between prior ROA 
and reputation confirm statements made by the Fortune 
authors. "Big Blues' decline (in reputation) reflects 
two years of disappointing profits (Schultz, 1988)." 
Economics 
The literature of economics suggests there is a 
relationship between reputation and subsequent 
performance. Shapiro (1983) points out that reputation 
is an asset. Reputation sometimes appears on balance 
sheets as "good will." 
Cornell and Shapiro (1986) discuss the influence of 
reputation on the price stakeholders will be willing to 
pay for implicit claims. Reputation for quality of 
management was found to be related to subsequent ROA for 
industrial firms, Table 4-31. It does not apparently 
influence total stock return, which includes the price 
stockholders pay for a firm's implicit future stream of 
earnings, Table 4-24. 
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Cornell and Shapiro also suggest that reputation 
gained from performance on one set of implicit claims may 
influence customers' willingness to pay for another set 
of implicit claims. Similarly, reputation gained in one 
dimension might influence reputation in another 
dimension. The reputation for high quality of a firm's 
products might influence its reputation for ability to 
attract, develop, and keep talented people. In fact, the 
various dimensions of reputation were found to be highly 
correlated. 
Finance 
Black (1980) states that users of financial 
statements want an earnings figure that results in a 
constant price-earnings ratio. They want to see 
accounting measures that bear a dependable current 
relation to market measures. In the present study, 
marginal quality of management was found to be 
significantly related to contemporaneous total stock 
return, while other reputation measures were related to 
contemporaneous ROA. 
Several authors (e.g. Branch & Gale, 1983; Fama, 
1976) suggest that investors consider quality of 
managment, while Granatelli and Martin (1984) found that 
stock market returns of "well managed" firms did not 
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outperform a portfolio of randomly selected companies 
from the same industries. These views may be reconciled 
by the present results in that while quality of 
management is not significantly related to total stock 
return (see Table 4-39), the change in quality of 
management, marginal quality of management, is (see Table 
4-42). A possible reason for this may be the difference 
threshold, discussed under perception, below. 
Feigenbaum and Thomas (1986) discuss the evidence on 
the expected risk-return relationship, that may or may 
not be observed ex-post. Beta, the market measure of 
systematic risk, is related to subsequent ROA, as 
reported in Tables 4-26 and 4-31. It is also related to 
contemporaneous ROA (see Table 4-34). An accounting 
measure of risk, debt to assets, is related to prior ROA 
(see Table 4-2), as is beta (see Table 4-15). Debt to 
assets is also related to contemporaneous ROA, Table 4- 
35. It is interesting that, in the present study, risk 
measures are related to accounting return but not to 
stock market return. 
Marketing 
The popular literature focuses on how a firm may gain 
a good reputation, and public relations and advertising 
firms are engaged to accomplish this. Marketing News 
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(1986) cites Brouillard about what characteristics are 
important to a winning reputation. The present findings 
suggest that profitability is a key characteristic. 
Perception 
Bernardin and Beatty (1984) suggest that the halo 
effect may have a serious impact on performance 
evaluations in organizations. The various dimensions of 
reputation are highly correlated, Table 4-45, though they 
represent different areas of organizational 
responsibility, and so could represent a problem for 
performance evaluation. 
In general, perceptions of quality of management are 
not related to total stock return, but a newly created 
variable, marginal quality of management was very 
significantly related to total stock return, Table 4-42, 
more so than were prior residuals, beta, or accounting 
risk. Marginal quality of management represents the 
percent change in management from 1982 to 1984. This 
change may be related to total stock return because it 
represents a difference threshold (Dember, 1964): 
investors perceive a difference in management rather than 
its absolute quality and influence stock price 
accordingly. 
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Perceptual lag (Schneider, Hastorf, and Ellsworth, 
1979) is apparantly less than the lag considered in the 
present study, as reputation was more often significantly 
related to performance when the measures were 
simultaneous three-year averages, Table 4-36, than when 
performance represented a prior three-year period, Tables 
4-3 and 4-4. 
Research Methods 
Kerlinger (1973) discusses measurement as 
essentially a relation. The present study contributes 
information about a variety of relationships finding 
several that are significant, and many that might have 
been but are not. For example, perceived quality 
management might have been found to be measure of stock 
return, but marginal quality of management is a better 
measure. 
Strategic Management 
Finance theory, as presented by Aaker and Jacobson 
(1987) and Lubatkin and O'Neill (1987), suggests that 
risk will be related to return. The present study 
suggests that it generally is not. This does not mean 
that it does not represent important information. To the 
contrary, it is an independent piece of information that 
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might be considered separate from return in evaluating a 
firm or its managers. This follows Venkatraman and 
Ramanujam's (1986) recommendation on incorporating a 
variety of measures. Hackett (1985) and Chakravarthy 
(1986) suggest that managers represent all stakeholders. 
The relationship of various dimensions of reputation to 
ROA suggests that managers are perceived as representing 
a variety of interests to generate profits. 
The final conclusion is that expert perceptions are 
related to ROA, in keeping with the observation of 
McGuire, Schneeweis, and Hill (1986) that accounting 
based measures are predominant. Quality of management 
was significantly related to ROA in both prior and 
subsequent time periods. ROA is one of the most easily 
understood and widely circulated of firm performance 
measures. Its salience, attributed causal relationships, 
and a halo effect may account for the strong association 
with various perceptions of a firm. The Fortune survey 
data should be regarded as a valuable predictor of future 
ROA. Expert perceptions generally are not related to 
other measures of strategic performance. 
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TABLE 5-2 
SELECTED LITERATURE RELATING TO THE RESULTS 
Accounting 
Curtis, 1985 
Fisher & McGowan, 
1983; Solomon, 
1971; Harcourt, 
1965 
Attribution 
Butterfield and 
Powel1, 1981 
Kelley, 1967 
Kelley, 1971 
Business 
Schultz, 1988 
The accounting system reports only 
financial transactions, while 
ignoring other important business 
events such as the failure to 
preserve assets, decisions to 
downgrade product quality, and 
technological changes that make 
equipment obsolete. 
Scholars have strongly criticized 
ROI: the return in the numerator is 
not necessarily related to the 
investment in the denominator. 
Performance descriptions explained 
nearly half of the variance in 
attributions of leadership style. 
The covariance principle states that 
we attribute the cause of an action 
to the one factor with which it most 
strongly covaries. 
Attributions are based on three 
types of information. 
Distinctiveness information 
indicates how prominent a factor is. 
Consensus information indicates 
whether other individuals in the 
situation are associated with the 
same results. Consistency 
information indicates whether the 
association is stable over time. 
"Big Blues decline reflects two 
years of disappointing profits." 
(continued next page) 
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TABLE 5-2 (continued). 
Economics 
Cornel 1 and 
Shapiro, 1986 
Cornel 1 and 
Shapiro, 1986 
Shapiro, 1983 
Finance 
Black, 1980 
Branch and Gale, 
1983: 41 
Fama, 1976; 
Brealey & Myers, 
1984: 64-81, 248- 
257 
Fiegenbaum and 
Thomas, 1986 
Reputation influences performance 
because the price stakeholders will 
pay for implicit claims depends on 
their expectations of future 
payouts. 
Reputation gained from performance 
on one set of implicit claims may 
influence customers' willingness to 
pay for another set of implicit 
claims. 
Reputation is "an asset." 
Users of financial statements want 
an earnings figure that results in a 
constant price-earnings ratio. They 
want to see accounting measures that 
bear a dependable current relation 
to market measures. 
A favorable stock market evaluation 
of upper-level management justifies 
attractive managerial compensation 
packages, keeps shareholders happy, 
allows easier access to capital, 
facilitates relatively inexpensive 
acquisitions, and defends against 
takeovers. 
Tests have shown that in setting the 
market value of firms, investors 
adjust for differences in firms' 
accounting procedures. Investors 
are thought to immediately evaluate 
the impact of management change on a 
firm's future earnings. 
Contradictory empirical evidence on 
the risk-return relationship. Ex- 
ante, ex-post differences. 
(continued next page) 
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TABLE 5-2 (continued) 
Granatelli and 
Martin 1984 
Louis Harris and 
Associates, 1975 
Marketing 
B r o ui11 a r d , in 
Marketing News, 
1986 
Perception 
Bernard in & 
Beatty, 1984 
Dember, 1964 
Schneider, 
Hastorf, and 
El 1sworth, 1979 
Research Methods 
Kerlinger, 1973 
Stock market returns of "well 
managed" firms did not outperform a 
portfolio of randomly selected 
companies from the same industries. 
A Harris poll found that major 
institutional investors considered 
the quality of management to be the 
single most important criterion in 
the selection of stocks. 
Characteristics important to a 
winning reputation include quality 
of products, flexibility, high- 
caliber management, honesty, 
customer service, market leadership, 
and good communications. 
The halo effect may have a serious 
impact on performance evaluations in 
organizations. 
Difference threshold. 
Perceptual lag, halo effect, 
selective perception. 
Measurement is a relation. 
Strategic Management 
Aaker and Systematic and unsystematic risk. 
Jacobson, 1987 
Chakravarthy, Excellent organizations are 
1986 distinguished by the quality of 
their transformations and by their 
satisfaction of all stakeholders. 
Hackett, 1985 Managers' decisions may represent 
the interests of all stakeholders. 
(continued next page) 
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TABLE 5-2 (continued) 
Lubatkin and 
O'Neill, 1987 
McGuire, 
Schneeweis, and 
Hill, 1986 
Venkatraman and 
Ramanujam, 1986 
Mergers may increase risk generally. 
Related mergers may decrease 
systematic risk. 
In a review of selected literature 
of organizational performance, 
accounting based measures were found 
to be dominant. 
Useful research will involve 
different data sources: primary and 
secondary; financial and 
operational. 
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Directions for Further Research 
A number of the findings of the present study suggest 
questions for further research. Why were the two groups, 
carefully matched for industries and quality of 
management, so consistently different in the significance 
of relationships tested? The surprising relationship of 
marginal quality of management to total stock return 
merits further study. What is the relationship to future 
stock return? 
What are the perceptions of managers and investors 
about the causal relationships between management quality 
and performance? How are management and investment 
decisions based on such perceptions? How stable are 
perceptions over time? How are they affected by 
unpredictable events, like the Bhopal disaster? 
Finally, there is no pristine ideal of performance 
waiting to be revealed. Steers argued that "a meaningful 
way to understand the abstract idea of effectiveness is 
to consider how researchers have operationalized and 
measured the construct in their work" (1975: 546). 
Cameron and Whetton noted that: 
As a construct, organizational effectiveness is similar 
to an unmapped terrain, where the responsibility lies 
with the investigator to chart it (1983). 
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But the construct of organizational effectiveness is 
not an autonomous reality to be charted. Nor is an 
organization's performance a pure and absolute fact that 
we will one day measure with precision and certainty. 
"Woo and Willard (1983) (used) the PIMS data base to 
explicate the underlying dimensions of performance..." 
(Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986: 806). Underlying what 
"performance?" Performance "is" whatever we all think of 
it, and what we together agree it is, not once and for 
all, but in a dynamic social construction with respect to 
all stakeholders. The objective of the present study is 
to contribute to the process of understanding that 
dynamic social construction. We continually choose how 
we measure performance, whether consciously, or by 
default. It is hoped the present study will help inform 
that choice. 
186 
ENDNOTES 
1. Standard & Poor's COMPUSTAT service consists of a 
number of computer readable libraries of financial, 
statistical and market information covering several 
thousand industrial and non-industrial companies. 
2. While most mergers might be expected to reduce risk 
because of diversification, mergers do introduce some 
uncertainty, particularly around the event date. For 
this reason, increases in risk, at least temporary ones, 
would not be surprising. 
3. The market model expresses the return on an asset as 
a linear function of the market return, R , plus a random 
error component,e • (Lee,1985): 
R. = a•. + b•Rm + e . 
11 11 l m l 
4. Close study of Lee (1985:225) reveals inconsistent 
use of the time subscript, which has been corrected here. 
5. It should be noted that the mean adjusted return 
approach, mentioned first, is based on the average of 
past returns: i.e. a=l and p=0. This is sometimes 
referred to as the "naive model." 
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6. Data from 1985 and 1986 were added for correlation 
analysis of the Fortune variables only. The survey 
published in January of each year contains data collected 
in the prior year. The first year of the survey 
collected data for 1982, which was published in 1983. 
7. The industries (were) 25 of the largest in the 
fortune 500 and Fortune Service 500 directories of U.S. 
industrial and non-industrial corporations. Industry 
groups are based on categories established by the U.S. 
Office of Management and the Budget. Companies are 
assigned to industry groups according to the business 
that contributed most to the prior year's sales (or 
assets, for certain industries) (Sellers, 1985:18). 
8. Here quality of management is one of the eight simple 
attributes, not the average of all eight. 
9. The z-score of a variable X is also called the 
"standardized version of X," and calculated: 
h(X) = (X-mx)/ox 
where 
u = Mean of X. 
A 
a* = Variance of X. 
A 
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The mean and variance of a standardized random 
variable are always 0 and 1, respectively (Miller and 
Wichern, 1975) . 
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